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CHEATER'S PROOF: EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
TOWARD EDUCATIONAL TESTING AGENCIES MAY LEAVE
ACCUSED EXAMINEES No REMEDY TO CLEAR THEIR
NAMES

Aron E. Goldschneide/

l. INTRODUCTION

We live in an age in which standardized testing has become the
principal means to judge the capabilities, educational level, and potential
1
of young Americans. As a result of Congress's No Child Left Behind
2
Act, many grade school students now learn in their tender years that
numerically measurable achievement on standardized tests is the "be all
3
and end all" of their schooling and the key to their educational fate.
Increasingly, slower students are under great pressure to ferform
adequately on standardized tests to avoid being held back, while

'Associate, Law Finn of Daniel M. Jaffe, Philadelphia. B.F.A., New York University; J.D., Temple
University Beasley School of Law. I would like to thank Diane Maleson, Temple University
Professor of Law, for her encouragement in producing this paper. Thanks also to my loving family
for their patience and support.
I. As one critic of standardized testing describes the situation, "Our schools are in the midst
of a mass panic not seen since the swine flu epidemic-standardized testing." Gary Stager, Halt the
Testing Madness, 39 Dist. Administration 47 (July 2003) (available at http://www
.districtadministration.com/page.cfm?p=443).
2. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-7941 (West Supp. 2003).
3. See Stager, supra n. I (stating that the No Child Left Behind Act "will compel states to
test their students every year from grades 2-12 in order to rank schools and shut many of them
down. Our Proctor-in-Chief, George W. Bush, is extending the joys of standardized testing into
Head Start").
4. Supporters of the No Child Left Behind law argue that it prevents schools from claiming
good results based upon the perfonnance of the brightest students, while ignoring the perfonnance of
slow students. Jay Mathews, Federal Law's Effect: Raised Expectations, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld= A54 709-2003Jan 14&notF ound=true (Jan.
14, 2003). Another view, however, is that the law encourages schools threatened with closure to
leave students back in order to raise scores in the grade level to which the slow student is denied
admittance, and perhaps in the repeated grade as well if he drops out. One academic, holding this
view, suggests that, "'[i]t's not 'No Child Left Behind' ... it's 'Leave Them Behind and Blame
Them Too' at its worst, and perhaps a little better than status quo at its best."' !d. (quoting Tim
Hacsi, a Harvard Graduate School of Education researcher).
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brighter students must score in the higher percentiles in order to be
5
admitted to mentally gifted programs.
Similarly, standardized testing dominates the consciousness of many
college-bound high school students, who spend significant amounts of
their energy, thought and time on preparing for college entrance exams.
In response, a burgeoning movement in opposition to the Scholastic
6
Aptitude Test (SAT) has challenged that test's purposes and efficacy,
with a significant number of colleges, including the entire state system of
7
California, rejecting its use in their admissions criteria. Additionally, a
growing number of students who resent the role the test plays in their
8
lives have chosen to opt out of the SAT testing process altogether.
Aside from criticism regarding standardized testing's worthiness as
an educational tool, much of the controversy surrounding educational
testing has been over the methodologies used in formulating standardized
test questions. Charges that standardized test questions have inherent
5. For just one example of a school district's use of test scores to determine entry to its gitted
programs, see e.g. Providence Pub. Sch. Dist., Advanced Acad,mic Programs, Testing, http://www
.providenceschools.org/dept/gifted/index.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2006) ("students receiving a
combined score at or above the 6lst percentile on both the Naglieri Non-Verbal Ability Test and the
district's SAT I 0 will move to the next phase of the selection process"). Se, also FairTest Examr.,
Tests
Misused
fi;r
Enrichment
Program
Admissions,
http://www.fairtest.org/examarts/spring96/cnrich.htm (Spring 1996) (describing how academic
enrichment programs such as Northwestern University's Center for Talent Development, Stanford
University's Education Program for Gifted Youth, and The Institute for the Academic Advancement
of Youth (lA A Y) at Johns Hopkins University all usc the PSA T, SAT, ACT, or in the case of
younger students, l.Q. tests, to identify gifted students and set minimum scores for admission to their
programs).
6. For example, Richard C. Atkinson, president of the University of California system has
criticized those aspects of the exam that are vestiges of JQ tests, such as analogy sections that create
a "perverse incentive" for students to spend time and money preparing for "idiosyncratic" SAT
questions. Ben Gose & Jeffrey Selingo, The SAT's Greatest Test: Social, Legal, and Demographic
Forces Threaten to Dethrone the Most Widely Used Co/lege-Entrance l:xam, Chron. of Higher
Educ. A I 0 (Oct. 26, 200 I).
7. In February of 200 I, the University of California system made the surprising
announcement that its 170,000-student, nine-school group would no longer require the SAT for
admission to its colleges, a decision that has led other state universities with competitive admissions
such as North Carolina's public colleges and the University of Texas at Austin to reconsider their
SAT requirements./d. Additionally, Harvard, M.l.T., and eleven other "top colleges" are now part of
a study to determine whether state tests already administered in high schools could be relied upon to
assess students for college admissions purposes. !d.
8. For example, in one recent Colorado "testfest," a number of high school students
performed music and read books outside the building in which their fellow students were subject to
the rigors of the SAT. !d. Bill Wetzel, an NYU student and founder of an organization called
Students Against Testing, has announced plans to craft similar protests. /d. Though Wetzel
personally received an excellent 1420 SAT score, which no doubt helped him enter NYU, he says he
now wishes he had chosen an SAT -optional school. !d. Wetzel criticizes the way in which many of
his high school classes focused on achieving high SAT scores. "'I noticed the difference between
some classes, where the teachers and the students were trying to get the highest scores possible, and
classes that emphasized curiosity and real critical thinking."' /d. (quoting Bill Wetzel).
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9

racial or gender biases have long been center stage in educational news,
10
periodically refreshed by new studies and research.
As a result,
whether fair or not, the once-burnished image of the standardized test as
11
the "great equalizer" against privilege is largely a thing of the past.
Despite the controversy around standardized testing, exams like the
12
13
14
15
.
SAT, ACT,
GRE,
GMAT,
and LSAT
remam the gateway
through which the vast majority of students must pass if they wish to be
16
17
admitted to institutions of higher leaming. Indeed, the College Board,
while ostensibly admonishing colleges not to set minimum SAT
requirements for admissions, continues to publish what appear to be
minimum SAT "cut-offs" for more than twenty institutions in its College
18
Board College Handbook.
As if there were not enough controversy surrounding standardized

9. See Gose & Selingo. supra n. 6. at A l 0 (noting that the College Board. owner of the SAT,
"has done a good job holding onto the ball, [for close to twenty years] fending off critics who
maintain that the test discriminates against female and minority students"').
I 0. /d. The College Board has consistently pointed to evidence that the SAT actually predicts
that minority students will do hetter than they actually do in college. !d. Recent studies, however,
have shown that questions employing "dit1icult"' vocabulary actually favor minorities while "easier"
questions can be confusing to minority test takers because of cultural differences in their approach to
basic language. Jeffrey R. Young, Researchers Charge Racial Bias on the SAT, Chron. of Higher
Educ. A34 (Oct. I 0, 2003 ).
11. See Nicholas Lcmann, The Big Test: Thl.' Sl!cret of" the American Meritocrac:v (Farrar,
Straus & Giroux 1999). Leman explains that many educators involved in the evolution of
standardized testing believed it to be a tool for democratizing change-·- from Clark Kerr, who as
president of the University of California instituted a Master Plan hased on standardized testing to
"create a fair opportunity for anyone to join the elite," to Stanley Kaplan, founder of the Kaplan testprep schools who began his career coaching Jewish middle and working-class students, much like
himself, who prior to standardized testing were largely denied admittance to the higher echelons of
educational opportunity. !d. at II 0-12. 136. Though the current higher education landscape is
undoubtedly far more egalitarian than it was in the pre-testing age, standardized tests seem to have
earned a reputation for impeding the progress of minorities while favoring those from the established
classes. /d.
12. "ACT,"' when referring to the exam American College Testing administers, stands for
"American College Test."
13. "GRE" stands for "Graduate Record Exam."
14. "GMA T" stands for "General Management Aptitude Test."
15. "LSA T" stands for "Law School Admission Test."
16. Sel.' e.g Eric Hoover, The Changing Environment jiJr College Admissions, Chron. of
Higher Educ. A30 (Nov. 29, 2002) (describing how the majority of colleges continue to raise their
admissions standards, "including standardized-test scores and high-school grade-point averages"
leading to a corresponding drop in the acceptance rate from sixty-eight percent in 1992 to sixty
percent in 1999, despite decreasing numbers of students graduating high school).
17. The College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) is a non-profit educational
organization, chartered more than a century ago, which has primarily functioned as an administrator
of tests intended to dctennine which students will succeed in college. See in(ra nn. 41-50 and
accompanying text for a fuller description of this organization.
18. Gose & Selingo, supra n. 6, at A I 0.
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admissions testing over its questionable pedagogical legitimacy and
potential biases, it has become increasingly apparent that the integrity of
the testing process itself may be less than reliable. Opportunities abound
for students to gain advantages on standardized tests either through
sophisticated test-prep coaching or various forms of cheating. In
response, testing agencies reserve the right to, and do, invalidate scores
they consider suspect, whether they be those of individual testees
suspected of cheating or a class of test-takers, some of whom may have
been privy to leaked test questions or information gathered from prior
tests.
The following Article discusses the legal conflict that arises when a
test-taker challenges an invalidation determination made by a testing
agency which has cancelled, or intends to cancel the test-taker's
standardized test score. More specifically, the Article focuses on the
legal hurdles the accused examinee must surmount in order to preserve
the challenged score through legal action. The author argues that it is
unduly burdensome for a test-taker to pursue a worthy claim under
existing "testing law," due to the excessive deference paid to testing
services by the courts, the difficulties in bringing equitable actions, and
the limited legal avenues available to plaintiffs. Simply put, an innocent
test-taker who has been unjustly accused of cheating may not be able to
clear his/her name.
Accordingly, the Article offers a critical look at the legal standards
courts have set, primarily concerning the due process and contractual
rights of test-takers, and offers suggestions for a more equitable
approach. The author questions the established judicial policy of noninterference in testing determinations and doubts the prevailing
assumption that interference in testing agency determinations would
threaten testing integrity. The author reasons that judicial deference may
ultimately undermine testing validity, because it reinforces testing
agencies' largely unfettered power to invalidate large score increases that
might otherwise raise questions about testing reliability and fails to
compel testing agencies to make meaningful improvements in testing
administration and security. Part II of this Article discusses the scope of
the standardized cheating problem, emphasizing emerging problems in
maintaining testing validity. Part III provides background on the major
institutions involved in standardized testing. Part IV presents a general
overview of legal barriers to standardized testing invalidation challenges,
with particular focus on the difficulties of bringing equitable actions. Part
V focuses on the two main legal avenues available to standardized
testing plaintiffs, with subsection A devoted to unconscionability and
breach of contract claims, and subsection B discussing violation of due
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process claims. Part VI provides a critical analysis of the chief
assumptions underlying judicial deference to testing agency
determinations. Finally, Part VII urges courts to reject formalistic
enforcement of adhesion contracts and instead exercise powers of equity
to validate examinee scores in appropriate cases. The author concludes
that unless courts reconsider the unwarranted judicial deference accorded
testing agencies, innocent test-takers wrongly accused by testing
agencies will continue to be left without a meaningful legal remedy to
clear their names and validate their scores.
II. SCOPE OF THE CHEATING PROBLEM

Standardized testing agencies are having an increasingly difficult
time controlling exam security and maintaining testing validity. The
scope and seriousness of recent security breaches indicate that
standardized testing procedures are vulnerable to cheating on multiple
fronts. Examinee access to re-used test questions prior to testing, hightech spying, and test-taking by imposter examinees a11 threaten the
integrity of test-taking results, in part justifying the vigor with which
test-taking agencies respond to those potential instances of cheating that
they manage to discover.
For example, the National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners
(NBPME) and its agent Chauncey, a subsidiary of the Educational
Testing Service (ETS), not long ago invalidated an entire July 2002
computer-based test taken by podiatry students at the New York College
19
of Podiatric Medicine (NYCPM). Claiming proof by "'documented
evidence"' that NYCPM students had "access to 'documents containing
secure test questions,"' the NBPME withheld score results and mailed
notifications to students' intended recipients, mostly hospital residency
0
programs, detailing its a11egations?
At roughly the same time that ETS's Chauncey subsidiary was
invalidating the NYCPM students' scores, ETS was also issuing bu11etins
to American universities that GRE scores from China, Taiwan, and South
21
Korea might be suspect. Attached to these warnings were bemusing
qualifications that most Asian test-takers were hard-working and their

19. Doe v. Nat/. Bd. of Podiatric Med. Examr., 2003 WL 21403698 at* I (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
2003).
20. !d. at** 1-2 (quoting the NBPME web site). In an ensuing action in the United District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sixty NYCPM student plaintiffs brought an action to
compel Chauncey to release their scores but failed to win a preliminary injunction. !d. at* I.
21. David L. Wheeler, Testing Service Says GRE Scores From China, South Korea, and
Taiwan Are Suspect, Chron. of Higher Educ. A41 (Aug. 16, 2002).
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22

Concerns over Asian GRE scores were
scores genuinely earned.
prompted by information ETS obtained that students were using the
Internet to post questions (and sometimes answers) that they remembered
23
from previous tests. With each student remembering just one or two
24
questions, the aggregate question pool was apparently substantial. As a
consequence of this question pooling, ETS claimed that national average
test scores had increased one hundred points in China, and fifty points in
25
Taiwan and South Korea.
Because testing agencies reuse exam questions, many standardized
testing exams are vulnerable to question pooling. The same test questions
may appear on multiple exams over a certain period of time, especially
6
on computer-based tests.Z Even on paper and pencil exams, a significant
percentage of test questions may be re-used, primarily for the purposes of
27
maintaining consistency across successive tests.
While Internet
question pooling is of recent concern to testing agencies, attempts to gain
an edge by studying prior test questions are nothing new. Testing
agencies have for many years been locked in intellectual property battles
with their traditional test-prep nemeses, Kaplan and Princeton Review,
accusing them of improperly using copyrighted materials from previous
exams and even sending in dumm1 test-takers with the express purpose
8
of copying questions from exams. In an effort to curb the leaking of
22. !d. The GRE Board, which sets policies and oversees the use of the GRE. "felt it had no
choice but to tell graduate schools about the problems with the test, but [was nonetheless] trying to
publicly acknowledge that many Asian students [were] scoring high because of hard work, not
cheating.'" /d. Meanwhile, the ETS was "urging universities to look at the scores in the context of the
students' other achievements, their essays, and their letters of recommendation.'' /d.
23. !d.
24. !d.
25. !d.
26. !d.
27. See Nat/. Con/ of'Bar txamrs. v. Saccuz::.o, 2003 WL 21467772 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2003)
(citing Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986)) (discussing the importance of
reusing test questions). See also infra n. 303 (discussing a Supreme Court opinion that explained this
process).
2K H.g. Lernann, supra n. II, at 113 (recounting how Stanley Kaplan, founder of Kaplan
schools, was treated as a "pariah" by the ETS, particularly for holding post-SAT parties where
students remembered and discussed questions from the exam they just took), 229 (recounting how
"[i]n the early days, [John] Katzman [founder of Princeton Review] obtained his prep materials by
doing exactly what Kaplan had done in his early days. As [Katzman] put it: 'We'd send people in to
take tests, and send ourselves in. I'd take ten, fifteen kids and say: I'll buy you Chinese food if you
tell me as many questions as you can remember"'). See also Critics Blast College Board
Requirement That SAT Proc/ors Take "Oath" on Coaching, 48 Chron. of Higher Educ. A35 (Oct.
19, 2001) [hereinafter Critics Blasi] (reporting that the College Board discovered in Spring 200 I
"that a secure copy of the SAT II biology exam had been copied without authorization and was used
in private coaching"); Educ. Testing Scrv. v. Stanley Kaplan Educ. Clr., 965 F. Supp. 731, 734-35
(D. Mel. 1997) (recounting how in 1994 a Kaplan GRE product director sent several students in to
reconnoiter a new computer-based GRE-CAT to look for testing differences from the paper and
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test questions, ETS recently made the controversial demand that its SAT
proctors sign an oath that they would not work for test-prep schools
because of concerns that proctors would filch or reproduce exam
.
29
questiOns.
Naturally, reliable information on re-used questions is a valuable
commodity, and a major chip to be parlayed in the game of high stakes
testing, both for students and the cram schools that cater to them in an
increasingly competitive market. This is particularly true when a small
bump in a student's standardized test score can mean the difference in
that student gaining ~d~iss~on _to an elite school or ~rofession with all
0
the attendant economic Imphcatwns of that admission.
High-tech spying techniques further expand the scope of the cheating
problem. With sophisticated technologies increasingly available to the
general public, the level to which determined test "spies" can go in their
efforts to pilfer test questions is daunting. For example, two Columbia
undergraduate students were recently arrested for using walkie-talkies
and hij)h-tech transmitters to steal questions from a computer-based GRE
exam. Having gained admittance to a special disabilities testing room
by feigning a respiratory illness, the ostensible examinee distracted the
proctor, while his partner snuck into the testing room and attached a
device that not only intercepted questions from the computer but also
. th e bUI'ld'mg. 32
transmitted them to a van parked outside
This does not mean that a wily student need be particularly high-tech
to succeed in dramatically raising a test score by cheating. While
standardized exams, particularly graduate and professional tests, ~re
·
· 1 bei·ng administered through computer-based testmg
mcreasmg Y
·
d
(CBT),33 pencil and paper exams are still the norm for K-12 testmg an
· b t at the same time confirmed that test security was compromised by "high overlap"
penc1 1 versiOn u
between pools of questions on different tests).
29. Critics Blast, supra n. 28, at A35.
.
. ,
_ For a harsh example of how the smallest test score fractions can determme an exammee s
30
". h 576 s E 2d 899 900 (Ga. 2003) in which a Georg1a Bar exammee contested
future, see In re ,)mg ,
· ·
'
'
.
E
1 · him
·
ACT rounded and scaled his raw scores on the Multlstate Bar xam, eavmg
t he way exammer
G
· s
with a 269. total score, short of the 270 points he needed for admission .. As the eorg1a upreme
9
Court put it, bluntly and without a trace of sympathy: "applicant Smgh ach1eved a score of269.9, not
a passing score." !d.
·
34
31. Dan Carnevale, High-Tech Cheating Alleged in GRE, 49 Chron. of H1gher Educ. A
(Dec. 6, 2002).
32. !d.
. d T
.r h
33 See Allison Yang, A New and Improved Way to Fail: Why the Standardtze
ests <If t e
Future ~on't be Quite So Standard Anymore, 30 Yale Herald Online I~~ 2, 7~10 (Oct. 27, 2000)
http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/xxx/2000.1 0.27/features/exc\usive.htm\ (statmg that both the
GRE and the GMA T are now computer based, with the GRE exclusively so m Amenca, an~
discussing how computer-based tests may favor younger, more tech-savvy exammees and ~~~
from the developed world); see also JustColleges, About the TOEFL
'
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34

college-entrance testing, and both are vulnerable to students copying
from their neighbors and to imposter examinees taking tests as "ringers"
for other students. The vulnerability lies not in the test-taking process
itself but in the failure of identity checking procedures to stop
impersonators before they sit for tests.
Proof of the extent of this imposter examinee problem can be found
in the approximately sixty criminal cases pending in the District Court of
New Jersey in which numerous foreign nationals are charged with
attempting to defraud ETS in connection with its Test of English as a
35
Foreign Language (TOEFL) exam by using imposters to test for them.
In one of the first pre-trial determinations rendered in this slew of cases,
36
United States v. Alsugair, the district court held that ETS had a
property interest in both its trademark and goodwill, and that the
defendant could be charged with mail fraud for depriving ETS of that
37
interest through an elaborate scheme involving the substitution of
photographs, forging of documents, and the mailing of a phony ETS
38
envelope.
http://www.justcolleges.com/ tests/index.phtml?no=tests_toeflcbt.htm (accessed Sept. 28, 2005)
(indicating that the Test of English as a Foreign Language is now offered both as a CBT and a paper
and pencil test and explaining some of the advantages and disadvantages of each); American College
of Physicians, Board Exams About to Make the Move to Computers, ACP Observer (Nov. 2003)
(available at http://www.acponline.org/ journals/news/nov03/abim.htm) (announcing that the
American Board of Internal Medicine plans to change all its certification and recertification exams to
computer based testing by 2006); American Association of Critical Care Nurses, CCRN and CCNS
Paper-and-Pencil Exams Offered as Option in Rural Areas, 17 AACN News (newsletter of the Am.
of
Critical
Care
Nurses)
2,
~~
2-3
(Nov.
2000)
(available
at
Assoc.
http://www .aacn.org/AACN/aacnnews. nsf/0/d I a 740f42a2bcf66882569ce00812ae0
?OpenDocument#paper) (announcing that pencil and paper exams are available to those living in
rural areas but noting that the less expensive method of test-taking is at urban computer centers).
34. See Yang, supra n. 33, at ~ 12 (indicating that the SAT, ACT, and MCAT arc still
administered by paper and pencil and that "[t]or the SAT and ACT, the obstacle in the high-tech
conversion is the sheer number of test-takers each year and the still limited computer accesses in
many secondary schools across the nation").
35. See e.g. U.S. v. Alsugair, 256 F. Supp. 2d 306,309 n. 2 (D.N.J. 2003). The court also cited
to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey news release entitled "Dozens
of Foreign Students Arrested Nationwide in English Language Testing Scam," indicating that the
problem was not limited to just New Jersey. !d.
36. 256 F. Supp. 2d 306.
37. !d. at 319. The court, however, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss allegations
based on deprivation of ETS's property interest in its copyright, as well as administration and
scoring services. I d.
38. The fraudulent scheme for which the defendant was charged was described by the court as
follows:
The imposter allegedly appeared at a test site and falsely identified himself as the student who
had to take the exam. This imposter, posing as the student, had his photo taken at the test site,
sat for the TOEFL exam, and directed that the exam results be mailed to a predetermined
location in California. Once the test results arrived, the real student's photograph was
substituted for the imposter's photograph, and the fraudulent TOEFL exam results were then
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The scale of these and other attacks on testing security and reliability
suggest that the reputation of standardized testing agencies and the
validity of the exams they administer are ever-more fragile. Surveying
the cram-school landscape, John Katzman, CEO and founder of test-prep
leader Princeton Review, boldly proclaims, "Let's face it, there's
cheating at every level ... Teachers cheat. Principals cheat. Sometimes,
39
whole communities cheat ... ".
In the face of such charges, services like ETS will no doubt continue
to manifest a very strong interest in protecting their image as providers of
accurate information. As one court has observed, it is their "sole stock in
40
trade."
Ill. BACKGROUND: THE COLLEGE BOARD, ACE, ETS, AND ACT
In order to better understand the forces at work in standardized
educational testing cases, some background on the principal testing
players may be helpful, namely the College Entrance Examination
Board, the American Council on Education, and the two major American
testing agencies-Educational Testing Service and American College
Testing.
The College Examination Entrance Board (CEEB), founded in 1900,
is a non-profit membership organization "composed of more than 4,700
schools, colleges, universities, and other educational organizations,"
which describes its mission as "connect[ing] students to college success
1
and opportunity.',4 The College Board, as it is generally known, boasts
of "serv[ing] over three and a half million students and their parents,
23,000 high schools, and 3,500 colleges through major programs," and
oversees the SAT, PSAT, and the Advanced Placement Program (AP),
42
among others.
In its early years, the College Board primarily functioned as "a
tweedy, clubby association of a few dozen private schools and colleges [
] founded in 1900 to perfect the close fit between New England boarding
43
schools and Ivy League colleges." To effectuate this purpose, the
Board administered "a weeklong battery of essay examinations in

mailed to schools requiring the real student's exam results in a phony ETS envelope.
ld. at 309.
39. Critics Blast, supra n. 2R, at A35.
40. In rc K.D. v. Fduc. TestinxServ, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747,752 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
41. College Board, Ahout Us, http://www.collcgeboard.com/about/index.html (accessed Sept.
28, 2005).
42. ld.
43. Lemann, supra n. II, at 28-29.
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various subjects, called the 'college boards, "' which served as "a
uniform admissions test that all the [prestigious] colleges would
45
accept. "
Later, however, the Board became the administrator of the Scholastic
Aptitude Test, or SAT as it came to be known, to a much wider body of
students. The SAT, which had its origins in Army intelligence tests, was
first tried out on high school students in 1926, not for admissions
purposes, but in order to establish the test's validity in predicting test46
By the mid-to-late 1930's, however, the
takers' freshman grades.
newly-automated SAT, along with a battery of additional subject-specific
multiple choice tests, became the testing pathway for high school
47
students seeking scholarship admission to Ivy League schools. Then,
just weeks after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the essay examinations of
the college boards were suspended, never to be resurrected, and the SAT
became the "admissions device" for all students seeking entry to Ivy
48
League schools.
Several years later, at the close of World War II, the president of the
Carnegie Foundation of philanthropic charities approached Henry
Chauncey, head of testing at the College Board, about the College Board
taking over the Carnegie-run Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and
ultimately instituting a national testing agency to administer all
49
standardized tests in America. But while Chauncey and the Carnegie
Foundation were excited about new plans to expand and consolidate
national testing, a powerful national educational interest had to be
negotiated with: the American Council on Education.
Founded in 1918, the American Council on Education (ACE) is a
non-profit membership organization that now claims to have enlisted
more than "1,800 accredited, degree-granting colleges and universities
and higher education-related associations, organizations, and
51
corporations" in its ranks. The Council, which oversees the high school
equivalency General Educational Development (GED) exam, describes
its mission as "provid[ing] leadership and a unifying voice on key higher
education issues" and "influenc[ing] public policy through advocacy,

5°

44. !d.
45. !d.
46. !d. at 32.
47. !d. at 39.

48. !d. at 54.
49. !d. at 60-61.
50. !d. at 62.
51. American Council on Education, Ahout ACE, http://www.acenet.edu/AM/Template
.cfm?Section=Aboutl (accessed Sept. 28, 2005).
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research, and program initiatives. " 52
In 1945, ACE was considered, according to its leader George Zook,
"the leading educational organization in the country." 53 When Zook was
approached for his endorsement of a national testing agency plan, he
sought. to
make the proposed agency a subsidiary of his own
.
54
orgamzatwn. Indeed, he was highly opposed to the College Board,
which he considered to be a "tiny, regional, elitist" organization, taking
55
charge of any national standardized testing plans. Soon after Zook
made his position known, a committee commissioned by the president of
Harvard, in order to obtain ACE's support, suggested that the College
Board essentiallf "hand over all its tests to the new agency and then
5
cease to exist."
Nonetheless, after much infighting, politicking, and some heavy anntwisting from the Carnegie foundation, it was the College Board that
57
eventually "won out." Consequently, when the Educational Testing
Service was chartered and opened its doors on January I, 1948 in
Princeton, New Jersey, Henry Chauncey of the College Board presided
.
.
58
over Its operatiOns.
For more than ten years following its inauguration in 1948, ETS
"'enjoyed what amount[ ed] practically to a monopoly in college
59
admissions testing. "' Not only did ETS own the copyrights to all the
major higher education tests, but it had also "inherit[ed] from the College
Board all the most prestigious private universities in the East as
60
clients." And yet the activities of the College Board and ETS had
hitherto been restricted almost entirely to the elite schools of the
Northeast. If they were to become truly national players, they would
have to gain entry to the state school systems of the Midwest and West,
which were generally open-admissions, and resistant to standardized
61
. .
d .
tests as admisswns evtces.
Unfortunately for ETS, in 1959, ETS's first serious competitor,
American College Testing (ACT), was born in America's heartland of

52. American Council on Education, Mission Statement, http://www.acenet.edu/Content/
NavigationMenu/About/Mission/ACE_Mission_Statcme.htm (accessed Sept. 28, 2005).
53. Lcmann, supra n. I ! , at 62.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
Harvard,
59.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 63-65.
!d. at 65. ETS was chartered with Chauncey as president and James Conant, president of
as Chairman of the Board. !d.
!d. at 102-103 (quoting a confidential internal ETS report circulated in 1958).

60. Lemann, supra n. 11, at 96.
61. /d.at97.
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62

Iowa. Particularly alarming to ETS' s plans of national dominance was
the fact that ACT was attempting to capture the same state universities
6
that ETS was shooting for. The approaches of the two organizations,
however, as they battled "state by state," were quite different. While
ACT attacked from the bottom up, broadcasting a populist message that
emphasized "guidance and placement of the many," ETS remained elitist
in approach, with its mission being to find the most gifted students and
place them at the top universities, while "guiding the rest to lower their
.
.
,64
aspiratiOns.
In the coming years, the two organizations carved up the country,
with ETS seemingly capturing Texas, Michigan, Georgia, and Colorado,
65
and ACT claiming victories in Illinois and Ohio. The two companies'
battle for California's huge state school system typified their contrasting
approaches-ACT succeeded in winning over "the low-prestige, highbody-count . . . state[] colleges and junior colleges," while ETS
eventually managed to capture "the crown jewel, the University of
66
Califomia."
Today, ETS proclaims itself "the world's largest private educational
67
testing and measurement organization," and ACT remains ETS's chief
68
competitor, testing nearly as many high school seniors per year as ETS.
Though the two organizations retain their non-profit status, they are both
openly aggressive, competitive, and expansive in their orientation.
Indeed, ACT announces its vision "[t]o be the world's leading
provider of information for educational and career decisions in support of
69
\ife\ong \eaming." Meanwhile, ETS, which "develops and administers
more than twelve million tests [in almost two hundred countries]
70
worldwide," has signaled its intention to "broaden its scope beyond the
U.S. measurement space into the worldwide education and training
71
space." This testing goliath, which already formulates and administers
the SAT, PSAT, AP, GMAT, GRE, and TOEFL, specifically has its eyes
on "increasing its presence in certain education markets[:] K-12,

62. !d. at 95: see ACT, Ahout ACT, http://www.act.org/aboutact/history.html (accessed Sept.
28, 2005).
63. Lemann, supra n. II, at 95.
64. !d. at I 03.
65. !d. at I 04.
66. !d.
67. Educational Testing Service, Ahout
(accessed Mar. 9, 2004) (copy on file with author).

ETS,

http://www.ets.org/aboutets/index.html

6R. Lemann, supra n. II, at 95.
69. ACT, Overview, http://www.act.org/aboutact/ (accessed Sept. 28, 2005 ).
70. Educational Testing Service, supra n. 67.

71. /d.
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oc~upational testing and training, and the international arena-Europe,
Asia, and Latin America[]." 72
IV.

OVERVIEW OF LEGAL BARRIERS TO SCORE INV ALIDA TION
CHALLENGES

~aun~ing_ hurdles fa_ce standardized testing examinees who challenge
the m_vahdation of their standardized test scores by testing agencies.
Exammees lucky enough to have their day in court are often frustrated by
the r~fusal of co~rts to rule on the merits of whether the particular
exammee ~heated mstead of on factors that generally resolve favorably
for the testmg agency. Other difficulties for examinees derive from the
nat~r_e of ~he equi_table relief they seek. The majority of examinees seek
an lllJU~ctwn barnng the agency from canceling their scores or directing
the testmg agency to release or reinstate their scores. This equitable
postur~ ~akes an examinee's case difficult to pursue for several reasons:
1) tra?1t10nal deference on the part of courts toward educational testing
agenc1es and their determinations, based on established equitable
policies; 2) the expense in bringing an equitable claim; and 3) the high
burden of proof required for the granting of injunctive relief.
As this Article's review oftesting case law will show, plaintiffs have
obtained limited success in only a handful of recorded invalidation cases,
and even these "victories" did not ultimately result in meaningful relief
for plaintiffs. An even bleaker picture for suspected examinees emerges
if one considers that recorded cases likely showcase the claims of only a
tiny fraction of examinees who maintain their scores were invalidated
unfairly. The "tip of the iceberg" principle operates in many areas of
litigation, since reported cases are only a fraction of the total number of
cases brought to trial, which are only a fraction of the cases settled prior
73
to trial, which are only a fraction of the claims never filed, and so on.
72. /d.
73. See Andre N. Mocnssens, Novel Scientific Hvidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of
Caution, X4 J. Crim. L. & Criminology I, 9-10 (Spring 1993) (noting the operation of this "tip of the
iceberg" principle in the context of fraudulent expert witnesses); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking
Adequacv Seriouslv: Thi! Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Utigation and Settlement Classes,
57 Vand. L. Rev. 1687, 1743 (2004) (invoking the principle in noting that it is difficult to estimate
the true incidence of class action filings and their attendant litigation "since many class action suits
involve ongoing litigation in which events and outcomes never result in reported orders, decisions,
or appellate opinions."); See also Dow v. Donovan, ISO F. Supp. 2d 249, 271 (D. Mass. 200 I)
("[T]he record of reported cases (probably only the tip of the iceberg) shows a history of slow
recognition of [frequent conflicts of interest between liability insurers and policyholders sued in
tort]."); Caroline R. Adams, Student Author, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Uve
and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000: Will R/uipa 's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court's
Strict Scrutiny~. 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2361, 2381 (May 2002) (recounting scholar's testimony before
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For the following reasons, however, there is cause to believe that this "tip
of the iceberg" principle applies with particular force to standardized
testing claims, and that effective remedies are largely out of reach for
examinees who have been wronged by invalidation determinations.
A. Refusal o_fCourts to Make Determinations on Whether Individual
Test-Takers Cheated
As will be discussed below, some litigants have brought court
challenges attacking contractual restrictions limiting dispute resolution to
74
internal investigation or binding arbitration.
Because invalidation
matters are contractually subject to either the testing agency's internal
75
investigation or binding arbitration, most disputes will not reach the
courts. Additionally, the litigants have challen~ed provisions limiting the
scope and procedural depth ofthese inquiries. Nonetheless, courts have
invariably refused to rule on the merits of whether particular test-takers
cheated and have thereby denied plaintiffs any chance to attain their
ultimate remedy. Rather than ruling on whether examinees cheated,
courts limit their determination to whether the testing agency I) had a
substantial basis for challenging the examinee's score, 2) provided
adequate procedural avenues for the examinee to attempt to validate the
score, and/or 3) made a good faith effort to investigate the alleged testing
77
"irregularities" fully.
The first area of inquiry, a showing by the testing agency that it had a
substantial basis to challenge a score, is not difficult for the testing
agency to establish. A review of cases involving cancellation of
individual examinees' test results shows that the trigger that almost
always set off the initial investigation was a very large increase in scores
.
.
. can o f'~"1er num bers
across successive
tests. 78 8 ecause testmg
agencies

Congress in which he invoked the "tip of the iceberg" principle to assc11 that minority religions were
"vastly over-represented in zoning litigation and 'frequently discriminated against.'").
74. See inji·a nn. 168-176 and accompanying text.
75. See infi-a nn. 148-156 and accompanying text (discussing testing booklet contract
provisions).
76. !d.
77. See e.g. Murray v. F.duc. Testing Sav., 170 F.3d 514, 516 17 (5th Cir. 1999); Scott v.
Educ. Testing Serv., 600 A.2d 500, 503--05 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1991); /)a/ton v. Educ. Testing
Serv, 663 N.E.2d 289,291-95 (N.Y. 1995) (illustrating cases in which courts f(Jcused their inquiry
on thc8e areas, but declined to rule on whether the plaintiff actually cheated, sec the following).
78. See rangston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380, 381 (II th Cir. 1989) (noting that any score that
increased by more than a certain amount of points would be "automatically flag[ged]" by ACT's
computer marking system); sl!e also Ko:ca v. ACT, Inc, 2001 WL I 191050, at *I (Mich. App. Oct.
I 0, 200 I) (reporting that ACT stated in a letter to plaintiff that it "reviewed 'all unusual score
increases"'); Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290 (reporting that plaintiffs score increase of more than 350
points across successive SAT exams fell into the category of what ETS termed '"Large Score
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demonstrating the rareness of such large increases between tests and
80
studies maintaining they are virtually impossible to achieve fairly, a
large increase by itself goes a long way to providing a substantial basis
for the testing agency's challenge. Add impressive-looking statistical
odds against a test-taker's answer sheet matching so many answers on
81
another test-taker's sheet, or expert opinion that the handwriting on the
82
test-taker's first test did not match her second, and the establishment of
a substantial basis for the challenge is largely a foregone conclusion.
As to the second area of inquiry, the procedural avenues afforded the
suspected testee to validate his or her score, there has hardly been a
testing invalidation opinion that failed to mention that ETS and ACT
gave examinees suspected of cheating a chance to retest at no expense in
83
order to confirm their scores. Other procedures that courts have pointed
to as adequate means of validating a suspected examinee's scores include
allowing test-takers to submit evidence that might help to confirm the
84
validity of their test results, giving them the chance to be heard at a
85
hearing, and offering them the opportunity to submit their dispute to
86
binding arbitration.
Relying on this list of ostensible protections
afforded the test-taker, courts have uniformly found that testing agencies
offered suspected examinees adequate procedural avenues to confirm

Differences"' or '"discrepant scores"' and triggered an automatic investigation); Cortale v. Educ.
Testing Serv., 251 A.D.2d 528, 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1998) (noting that examinee's increase
of 200 points across successive GRE exams was deemed by ETS "to be suspicious" and triggered an
investigation).
79. See e.g Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (noting that in its internal review, ETS "took into
consideration the fact that only three test takers out of a sample of over 7,000 recorded gains of more
than 42 points in [a] General Knowledge test).
80. See Sarah Stockwell et al., The SAT Coaching Coverup: How Test Preparation Programs
Can Raise Scores by 100 Points or More and Why the College Board and ETS Deny the Evidence 9
(Natl. Ctr. for Fair & Open Testing 1991) (noting that up until 1988, the College Board maintained
that various studies showed that test-prep coaching only raised SAT scores from zero to thirty
points).
81. In some cases, these statistics would appear virtually conclusive that the examinee
cheated. See eg. Tolleson v. Educ. Testing Serv .. 832 F. Supp. 158, 159 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing as an
established fact that the odds that plaintiff could have answered "all of the 98 correct responses the
same and 31 out of 38 incorrect responses the same" as a neighboring examinee arc "less than 1 in
100,000,000;" based on statistical evidence provided by the chairperson of the ETS Board of
Review).
82. .Johnson v. Hduc. Testing Serv .. Inc., 615 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Mass. 1984 ).
83. Langston, 890 F.2d at 387; .Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637; Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at* 1;
Yaeger v. Hduc. Testing Serv., 551 N.Y.S.2d 574,576 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1990). Perhaps the only
testing invalidation case cited in this Article that did not mention this fact was Cortale, 251 A.D.2d
528.
84. Murray, 170 FJd at 516; .Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637.
85 . .Johnson. 615 F. Supp. at 637.
86. Langston, 890 F.2d at 387.
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87

suspected scores.
Only the third area of inquiry, whether the testing agency made a
good faith effort to investigate the alleged testing "irregularities" fully, is
likely to undergo close scrutiny by the court. This area of inquiry will be
discussed at length later in this Article.

B. Judicial Deference to Testing Agencies
Recorded case law shows an established pattern of judicial deference
to educational testing agency invalidation determinations based ufon
8
public policy concerns. In Dalton v. Educational Testing Service, an
influential SAT score cancellation case, New York's highest court
opined that Educational Testing Service was due much the same judicial
89
deference traditionally accorded academic institutions.
The court
summed up its position as follows:
The comparison between ETS and academic institutions is surely not
exact, inasmuch as judicial restraint in matters of academic
achievement is based, in part, on the inherently subjective nature of the
evaluation to be made by professional educators. Still, similar policy
concerns militate against directing ETS to release a questioned score.
When a standardized testing service reports a score, it certifies to the
world that the test-taker possesses the requisite knowledge and skills to
achieve the particular score. Like academic credentials, if courts were
to require testing services to release questioned scores, "the value of
these credenti~ds from the point of view of society would be seriously
undermined."
91

In In re K.D. v. Educational Testing Service, an earlier, much-cited
law school admissions testing case, the Supreme Court of New York
County stated specific policy concerns, here echoed by another court:
[A] testing service "performs a highly valuable service not only to the
law schools but to the public as well. Moreover, the accuracy of its
predictions is defendant's sole stock in trade. The less accurate as a
forecaster its tests are, the less value they have ... "Thus, when unable

87. This is not to suggest that courts addressing the adequacy of procedural avenues have
necessarily conducted a constitutional due process inquiry. In a number of cases, courts have ruled
only on whether the examinee was, in good faith, afforded the procedural opportunities guaranteed
by the testing contract. See Murray, 170 F.3d at 516; Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 638; Dalton, 663
N .E.2d at 291-95. For a review of those cases in which courts have ruled on violation of due process
claims, see infra nn. 239-303 and accompanying text.
88.
89.
90.
(citations
91.

663 N.E.2d 289.
!d. at 294.

/d. (quoting In re Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (N.Y. 1980))
omitted).
386 N.Y.S.2d 747.
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to vouch for the integrity of test results, a testing service is "within its
obligations and dutie~ t? th~ (college) and to the public in
2
requestmg ... a reexammatwn."

Accordingly, under this policy approach, even if significant factual
doubt is raised as to whether an examinee actually cheated, the court, in
balancing the equities, will still stop short of directing a testing agency to
93
report a suspect score. Not only do the courts emphasize "the reliance
that students, educational institutions, prospective employers and others
94
place on the legitimacy of scores released by [the testing agency ]," but
they also stress that '"(t]he other test-takers are entitled to assurance that
95
no examinee enjoys an unfair advantage in scoring. "' Finally, going
further, courts have declared that a testing agency's reputation itself is a
weighty interest, and that "'it act[s] within its right to protect its own
96
image,"' when it invalidates a suspect score.

C. Expense in Bringing Educational Testing Claims
Educational testing claims challenging invalidation determinations
are likely to be very expensive to pursue. Though some standardized
testing litigants do seek money damages in addition to equitable demands
for release of their test scores, common sense suggests that such claims
do not make attractive candidates for contingency representation. This is
because the chances of success based on established case law are slim,
97
and damages likely to be small, if capable of being proved at all.

92. Doe at *7 (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752) (citations omitted).
93. See Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291~95 (affirming the lower court's determination that ETS
breached its contract with a high school student by failing to consider in good faith considerable
factual evidence that the student had not cheated on an SAT exam, yet nonetheless modifying, on
public policy grounds, the lower court's affirmance of the trial court's order directing ETS to release
the student's SAT score, requiring only that ETS reconduct its investigation and duly consider
plaintiff's evidence).
94. !d. at 294.
95. Murray, 170 F.3d at 517 (quoting Scott, 600 A.2d at 504).
96. !d. (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752).
97. A fruitless search by the author found no recorded cases even mentioning any money
damages paid to a standardized testing examinee challenging an invalidation determination. This, of
course, does not mean that damages have never been paid. Rather it suggests that testing agencies
have done a good job of avoiding the establishment of legal precedents by wearing plaintiffs down,
settling when advantageous, or both. See Allan Nairn et al., The Reign ofETS: The Corporation That
Makes Up Minds 284 (The Ralph Nader Report on the Educ.Testing Serv. 1980) (describing how
ETS "inundated" a 23-ycar-old pro se plaintiff seeking compensation for a lost semester resulting
from "an ETS records foul-up" by filing "a docket of legal papers eight inches thick" before
eventually settling with the plaintiff for $250.00 after "photo-copy costs alone had drained [the
plaintiff's modest budget"). Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., plaintiffs' counsel in the Dalton and Cortale
cases discussed infra nn. 204~217, 218~236 and accompanying text, recounted how on many nights
he was "up until three in the morning" trying to answer ETS's legal onslaught during the litigation of
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Moreover, testing invalidation cases can be factually complex, most
likely requiring the production of multiple witnesses and costly experts.
A good example of this may be found in Dalton v. Educational Testing
98
Service, in which a high school student was accused by ETS of having
99
an imposter sit in his place for an SAT test. The Dalton plaintiff sought
an injunction prohibiting ETS from canceling his score and an order
compelling release of the score based on specific performance of his
100
testing contract.
In successfully arguing that ETS breached its duty of
101
good faith under the contract,
the plaintiff presented a total of sixteen
102
witnesses and ETS countered with nine.
The trial took twelve days
103
and "occupied more than 2,000 pages of transcript."
The trial was then
104
followed by two presumably costly appeals.
In the end, the New York
Court of Appeals effectively denied the plaintiff the relief he was seeking
105
when it ruled that ETS would not be directed to release his score.
Dalton is hardly the only instance of a standardized testing plaintiff
obtaining unfavorable results after presenting an extremely costly
invalidation claim. Similarly complex claims put forward by plaintiffs,
requiring the hiring of experts and the presentation of extensive
106
documentation, have fared poorly.
those cases. Telephone Interview with Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., Counsel in the Dalton and Cortale
(Mar. 26, 2004 ). Mr. Nicolosi stated that despite the fact that the Cortale plaintiff, based on ample
evidence supporting her innocence, won the opening rounds of her legal battle to clear her name,
discussed infra nn. 226-234 and accompanying text, her family decided to finally drop the case
since they could no longer afford to pursue the matter and the plaintiff had already graduated from
her graduate program with superlative marks. !d.
98. 588 N.Y.S.2d at 741, 742 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992), afl'd in part, 614 N.Y.S.2d
742, (N.Y, App. Div. 2d Dept. 1994), appeal denied, 629 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. 1995), afj'd and
modified, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. 1995), appeal dismissed, 629 N. Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. 1995).
99. /d.
I 00. !d. This equitable claim was the only cause of action originally brought by the plaintiff,
though he later amended his complaint to seek money damages under other causes of action. !d. at
742-43. The equitable claim was separated from the damages action and, following discovery, an
expedited bench trial was held on the original claim only. /d. at 743. A fruitless search by the author
found no record of the damages action.
101. !d. at 744.
I 02. !d. at 743.
103. !d.
l 04. The case was first appealed to the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division and then
to the New York Court of Appeals./d.
105. !d. at 294. See infra nn. 212--214 and accompanying text for a discussion on the relief
granted in Dalton.
l 06. See also Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637-39 (granting summary judgment for defendant
ETS on all five of plaintiffs claims and noting, even prior to trial, "extensive documentation"
provided by plaintiff to the ETS Board of Review, four meetings with the Board in which plaintiff
was represented by counsel, and the hiring by plaintiff of a handwriting expert, whose opinion,
favorable to the plaintiff, nonetheless could not outweigh three unfavorable opinions provided by
ETS's handwriting experts); see e.g. Langston, 890 F.2d at 383-88 (describing complex litigation at
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D. Heavy Burdens for Obtaining Injunctive Relief
When an individual standardized testing examinee receives word
that, following a testing agency investigation, his score has been
determined to be invalid, the only viable options he has to stop the
.
. hd rawmg
. h.IS score un d er h.zs contract 107
agency firom cance I mg
or Wit
are either to retest, which allows the examinee to validate his score if he
is able to come within a certain amount of points of the questioned
108
. 109 w h.1c h WI·11 not add ress t he
score,
or to agree to b.md.mg arb.1tratwn,
the district court level involving unsuccessful contractual, constitutional, and tort claims, and noting
plaintitrs hiring of at least two statistical experts in vainly challenging ACT's mathematical
methods for determining that plaintiff cheated).
I 07. See infi·a nn. 146-156 and accompanying text (providing a discussion on the test-taker's
booklet contract with the testing agency).
I 08. Cases differ, in different contexts, as to the range of points an examinee's retest must
come within in order to validate a suspected score. Langston, 890 F.2d at 382 n. 4 (test-taker at first
informed by ACT that retest score had to "confirm" suspected score but later was informed that if
retest score were "within a couple of points," then suspected score would be validated); Tolleson,
832 F. Supp. at 159 ( ETS required examinee to test within a fitly to a hundred point range of
suspected National Teacher's Exam (NTE) score of 650); Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *I (ACT
required examinee to retest within three points of suspected ACT composite score of 24 in order to
validate questioned score); In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (examinee required to retest within fifty
points of suspected LSAT score); DePina v. Educ. Testing Serv., 297 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (App. Div.
2d Dept. 1969) (testcc told retest scores would have to "approximate[ ]" questioned CEEl3 test
scores).
I 09. The current ETS bulletin for GRE testing states:
Invalid Scores. ETS may f] cancel scores it~ in its judgment, there is substantial evidence that
they arc invalid t(>r any f ] reason. Evidence of invalid scores may include, but is not limited to,
discrepant handwriting, unusual answer patterns, and inconsistent performance on different
parts of the test. l3efore canceling scores pursuant to this paragraph, ETS notifies the test taker
in writing about its concerns, gives the test taker an opportunity to submit information that
addresses ETS's concerns, considers any such information submitted, and offers the test taker a
choice of options. The options include voluntary score cancellation, a free retest, or arbitration
in accordance with ETS's standard Arbitration Agreement.
Educational Testing Service, Graduate Records L\amination lnjiJrmation and Registration Bulletin,
II (Educ. Testing Serv. 2005) (available at http://tlp.ets.org/pub/grei727122.pdf.). The current
bulletin for TOEFL testing states: "Note: For paper-based testing, the retest option is available only
to test takers in the United States and Canada. The arbitration option is available only for tests
administered in the United States." Educational Testing Service, Test of' English as a Foreign
Language lnfiJrmation and R<'gistration Bulletin jiJr Computer-based and Paper-based Testing, 15
(Educ. Testing Serv. 2005) (available at http://www.ets.org/Mcdia/Tests/TOEFL!pdf/toetl'Yt,2020056%20bulletin.pdf). See discussion inf'ra n. 156 and accompanying text (listing available options
afforded the tcstce).
Although upon the initial questioning of the testce's score, the testee is invited to submit
evidence supportive of the validity of the score, it is, of course, difficult to prove a negative, and
unlikely that a testing agency will change its determination (founded upon hard statistical evidence)
purely upon affidavits as to the testee's character, school performance, or circumstances surrounding
the testing event itself. In any case, once the testing agency has completed its internal investigation
and decided the score is invalid, the testee must either retest or submit to binding arbitration.
Another choice offered the examinee, allowing the recipient school to be the arbiter of the dispute,
hardly seems a credible option, since the last thing the test-taker wants is for his chosen school to
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issue of whether or not plaintiff cheated but rather focus on the propriety
of the testing agency's invalidation action, for example, '"whether the
testing agency acted reasonably and in good faith in deciding to cancel
110
[the examinee's] scores, "'
or "'whether there [was] substantial
evidence supporting cancellation of the scores in question based on the
111
Should the examinee refuse to retest or
information available .... "'
submit to binding arbitration, the testing agency will move to cancel the
score. It is at this point that an examinee may have to seek a preliminary
injunction if he wishes to block the testing agency from withdrawing the
score or notifying an educational institution to which he has already been
accepted. Due to the typically high standards required by courts before
granting an injunction, it is nearly impossible for an examinee to achieve
such relief.
An early testing case involving a request for a preliminary
112
illustrates just how
injunction, DePina v. Educational Testing Service,
heavy the burdens for examinees are. A testee sought a court order to
stop ETS from withdrawing his 1968 College Entrance Examination
Board scores and notifying the United States Merchant Marine Academy
113
Though the testee was granted a
that his scores had been invalidated.
preliminary injunction by the Supreme Court of Nassau County, the New
York Supreme Court Appellate Division reversed the order, calling it "an
114
While the court cited to "a
improvident exercise of discretion."
thorough comparison" made by ETS of the examinee's scores with the
scores of another test-taker, "reveal[ing~ circumstances which indicated,
15
it detailed no particular facts
prima facie, that plaintiff had cheated,"
116
from this comparison.
Nor did the court explicitly reference the sine
qua non for the granting of a preliminary injunction-a showing by the
plaintiff that without the injunction, the plaintiff would be irreparably
. Issumg
. .
. memoran durn opm10n,
..
Its
harme d. 117 Rather the court, m
become aware of doubts as to his score.
110. Koza. 2001 WL 1191050 at *3 (quoting ACT arbitration agreement form provided to
examinee that outlined the terms of arbitration to be conducted by the American Arbitration
Association).
Ill. Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (quoting ETS arbitration agreement form submitted to examinee
that provided for arbitration under American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration
Rules).
112. 297 N.Y.S.2d 472.
113. /d. at 473.
114. !d. at474.
115. !d. at 473.
116. !d.
117. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[p]erhaps the single most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the
applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered."
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generally "[took] into consideration the legal and equitable principles of
118
law applicable to the granting of preliminary injunctions,"
namely
that, "[when ruling on such motions] courts must weight [sic] the
interests of the general public as well as the interests of the parties to the
119
litigation."
This "weighing" of the interests led the court, without
comment on the interests of the examinee, to conclude that requiring the
examinee to retest was "within [ETS's] rights and indeed within its
120
obligations and duties to the Academy and to the public,"
and
therefore ETS would not be restrained from invalidating the examinee's
121
scores and notifying the Academy.
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of New York County, in In re
122
K.D. v. Educational Testing Service,
faced with "[a]lmost the identical
issue" decided in DePina, enlarged upon the policy grounds for denying
a restraining injunction. It likewise found ETS's offer to allow the LSAT
examinee to retest an adequate remedj, calling it "eminently fair and
12
reasonable under the circumstances."
Though In re K.D. was a more
well-reasoned, factual, and expansive opinion than DePina, its policy
basis for denying an injunction was based on the same assumption made
by the DePina court-that the testing agency was fulfillin~ its duty to
4
maintain reliability in providing "a highly valuable service."
Similarly, in 1990, the New York Supreme Court Appellate
125
Division, in Yaeger v. Educational Testing Service,
affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment dismissal of an examinee's suit seeking an
injunction prohibitin~ ETS from canceling her National Teacher
Examination scores.' As with In re K.D. and DePina, the court made
no mention of the testee's equitable interests in retaining her scores,
127
citing only to ETS's interests in maintaining testing validity.
Once
again, a one-sided "weighing" of the interests at stake suggested a strong
judicial presumption not only that the testing agency had good reason to
challenge the invalidated scores but also that the examinee was actually

Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985).
I I 8. DePina, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
I I 9. !d. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein, Korn and Miller CPLR manual,
6301.21 (Oscar G. Chase ed., rev. ed., Matthew Bender 1980)).
120. !d.
121. !d.
122. 386 N.Y.S.2d 747.
123. !d. at 752.
124. !d.
125. 551 N.Y.S.2d 574.
126. !d. at 575.
127. !d. at 576-77.
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gm'1 ty o f ch eatmg.
In the somewhat different context of a group invalidation dispute,
Doe v. The National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners
129
(NBPME),
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York recently provided an object lesson on the steep odds plaintiffs
130
face when seeking preliminary injunctions against testing agencies.
In
Doe, podiatry students, whose board scores were invalidated based on
general allegations of leaked test questions, sought a court order
compelling the National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners and ETS
131
subsidiary Chauncey to release their scores and certify them as valid.
The court stated that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
plaintiffs would have to show: "(I) irreparable harm in the absence of the
injunction and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the
movant ' s .c1avor. ,132
The court further declared that when the plaintiffs sought a
manda£ory (rather than prohibitory) injunction "to alter the status
3
quo,"IJ and a remedy that essentially provided the ultimate relief they
134
then they had to
were seeking (validation and release of their scores),
meet the still higher burden of "substantial, or clear showing of,
135
likelihood of success to obtain preliminary relief."
The court
concluded that the plaintiffs were unable to meet this burden, citing prior
case law in which courts, based on judicial deference to testing agencies,
136
denied relief to suspected examinees.
The court also held that the
plaintiffs could no_t "show t~at _'extrem~ or ~f{j' serious da~age [would]
result from a demal of prehmmary rehef.' · Downflaymg the havoc
13
retesting had wreaked on the lives of the students,
and the fact that

128. See id. (opining that "the record contains adequate evidence to support ETS'
determination to cancel the petitioner's scores on the ground of questionable validity," but offering
no examples of that evidence).
129. 2003 WL 21403698.
130. !d. at *I.
13\. !d.
132. /d. at *2.
133.
134.
135.
136.

!d.
!d.
/d. at *3 (quoting Jiim Doherty Assocs. v. Sahan Ent., 60 F.3d 27,35 (2d Cir. 1995)).
/d. at **3--4 (relying on In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 and Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289).

137. /d. (quoting Doherty, 60 F.3d at 35).
138. The examinees claimed a litany of hardships including adverse effects on "completing
their graduation requirements; participating in extemships, internships, and residency programs; and
obtaining a license for the practice of podiatric medicine." /d. at *2. The court admitted that the
students had to sit for the retest while "taking a full load of classes and participating in internship
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five of the sixty students who passed the invalidated first test failed on
139
the court emphasized the harm that would befall the testing
the retest,
agency's ability "'to make predictions of competency, acumen, and
performance based upon its expertise,"' and stressed the "valuable
service" that the a,ruency provided to medical institutions and the public
1
health in general.
Doe shows how high standards for preliminary injunctions, coupled
with established judicial deference to testing agencies, converge to form
a difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome. Consequently, in order for
an examinee plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction, she may have to
demonstrate blameworthy or morally questionable conduct on the P.art of
the testing agency that will tip the balance of equities in her favor. I'll

programs." !d. Nonetheless, the court opined that the "[d]efendants mitigated the harms suffered by
plaintiffs by offering a specially-scheduled free of charge retest." !d. at *6. The court emphasized the
positive stating that "[a]ll but five students passed [the retest]," and characterized seemingly
reasonable concerns by some students that their passing but lowered scores would hurt them in their
employment search as "speculative." !d.
139. !d.
140. !d. at *7.
141. ln two cases in which testing plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctions,
Cortale v. Educ. Testing Serv., 656 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1997) and Mindel v.
Educ. Testing Serv., 559 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990), plaintiffs were able to show, at a
minimum, irresponsible conduct on the part of ETS. In Cortale, an examinee sought a preliminary
injunction preventing ETS from canceling her GRE score based upon allegations that she copied
from another test-taker. 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156. The court granted her preliminary injunction and
denied ETS's motion for summary judgment in large part on facts that ETS destroyed plaintiffs test
booklet, in which plaintiff had made notes supporting her answers, after it began its investigation
into the validity of her scores. !d. at 157. After finding that the plaintiff had offered persuasive proof
that she would be irreparably harmed by the cancellation of her score, the court held that ETS 's
"destruction of evidence [ ] created both a reasonable probability of success and balancing of
equities in favor of the plaintiff." !d. In Mindel, the court granted a mandatory injunction ordering
ETS to cancel the score of an SAT testee and provide her an expedited retest. 559 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
As a factual predicate for its decision, the court cited several compelling, even shameful facts
showing that the administering of the examinee's SAT test was seriously flawed and unfair,
including undisputed evidence that the examinee's test booklet was borrowed from her by a proctor
while she was taking the test, and that a small child was allowed to enter the testing room several
times during the exam. !d. at 97. The court then found that the plaintiffs claim "met the three basic
requirements for a preliminary injunction." !d. at 98. First, the court found the plaintiff would be
injured irreparably by the "loss of the opportunity [to gain an early decision from the elite colleges
of her choice] due to the passage of time" if she were not given an immediate special opportunjty to
retest and improve her already excellent scores. !d. Second, the court found that the plaintiffs case
evinced "a likelihood of ultimate success." !d. Third, the court found that the balance of equities
favored the plaintiff. !d. In support of this last conclusion, as well as its decision to decide the matter
in favor of the plaintiff without need for a trial, the court pointed to the "the potential harm to the
plaintiff with no corresponding detriment to defendant." !d. at 98-99.
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V. AVAILABLE LEGAL A VENUES IN STANDARDIZED TESTING
INVALIDATION CASES

The following analysis addresses the two principal legal approaches
that standardized testing plaintiffs have taken in challenging
invalidations-breach of contract (or unconscionability of contract)
claims and violation of due process claims. Though some standardized
testing plaintiffs have also brought tort actions, alleging damages for
I42
.c
h
143
de [;amatwn,
mter1erence wit
contract, · or even outrageous
144
recorded cases largely show these claims to have been
conduct,
. heraI an d unavm.1mg.
. 145
penp
0

0

0

A. Contract Claims
Though the circumstances surrounding most standardized testing
cases raise obvious issues of adhesion and good faith dealing, contract
law has not been an especially fruitful source of relief for examinees
suspected of cheating. Still, contract law has produced some minor
victories for examinees. This subsection will first discuss the nature of
the testing "contract," and then discuss the efficacy of arguments based
on principles of adhesion and good faith.

142. Unless a testing agency publicizes its invalidation of a tcstee's score to an individual or
organization wholly unrelated to the testee's educational use of the test scores, publication will likely
be deemed privileged. For example, in Langston, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
any communication made "pursuant to a duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or where
the statement is one in which the speaker and the third party have corresponding interests," would be
privileged. 890 F.2d at 387. Under this standard, the court held that ACT's communications to the
examinee's guidance counselor, who had the duty of "posting ACT test scores on student's
transcripts and forwarding them to colleges" were privileged. !d. Thus the plaintiff would have to
show that the communications were made with malice. !d. The Langston court did not even bother to
address the unlikely possibility that ACT could have acted with malice, but rather granted summary
judgment to ACT on the plaintiff's defamation claim after its discussion of privilege and a bare
statement of the malice standard. !d. See also Johnson, 6 I 5 F. Supp. at 6 I 5 (holding that defendant
ETS's communications with law schools regarding a suspected examinee's questioned scores were
privileged).
143. The court in Johnson summarily dismissed this claim. stating that a showing of
interference with contract required the plaintitT to demonstrate that the interference was "intentional
and without justification," and concluding without further discussion that ETS's communication
with the recipient school in that case was justified. 6 I 5 F. Supp. at 639.
144. Considering the standard required for a showing of outrageous conduct as stated by the
Langston court, that is, conduct "outside the bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society," 890 F.2d at 387, it would appear that this claim, absent the most egregious misconduct
imaginable by the testing agency, would not have the proverbial snowball's chance.
145. Supra nn. 142-144.
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I. Testing "Contracts"
Before a prospective test-taker sits for a standardized college
entrance, graduate entrance, or professional licensing exam, that testtaker must enter into a contract with the testing service formulating and
146
This contract between the parties is formed
administering the exam.
when the test-taker signs the test registration form and ostensibl1' agrees
14
to be bound by the terms of the registration booklet or bulletin.
The registration bulletin or booklet provided by the testing agency
constitutes a standard form contract, which outlines its terms in langua~e
1 8
exactly the same for every examinee taking that version of the test.
The booklet contract generally contains p,rovisions warning test-takers
49
or engaging in any number
against reproducing any part of the exam,
of prohibited actions during the exam, such as looking back at sections of
the test already completed, giving or receiving help from other test150
takers, or viewing other test-takers' answer sheets or booklets.
Typically, the contract-booklet further informs prospective
examinees: I) that should it be suspected that information has been
151
reproduced from an exam, scores from that exam may be invalidated;
2) that the testing agency has the exclusive right to determine the validity
152
of an exam;
3) that the testing agency has the right to cancel a score if
153
it has reason to suspect the score is invalid
(for example, "if there is
an apparent discrepancy in photo identification, if the student engages in
154
misconduct, [or] if there is a testing irregularity ... " ); and 4) that the
test-taker must adhere to the testing agency's procedural guidelines
146. See Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 (addressing contract formation in the college entrance
examination context); Doe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *4 (addressing contract formation in the
licensing/residency admissions testing context); Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (addressing contract
formation in the college entrance examination context); Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 529-530 (addressing
contract formation in the graduate school entrance examination context).
147. Ex Murrav, 170 F.3d at 515.
148. It would appear that there may be some variations in testing contracts between
jurisdictions. See Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290 (noting that an SAT test-taker agreed to conditions
contained in a "New York State edition of the Registration Bulletin").
149. E.g. Doe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *4 (noting the NBPME bulletin's admonition that,
'"[a]ny attempt to reproduce all or part of an examination is strictly prohibited"').
150. E.g. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (reproducing a passage trom ACT's "'Test Security
Procedures"' which contains these and other prohibitions).
151. E.g. Doe, 2003 WL 2140369X at *4 (quoting the NBPME test bulletin's notice that,
"'examination scores may be invalidated in the event of this type of suspected [sharing of
information] breach"').
152. E.g. id. (quoting contract language stating that the NBPME reserved "'the sole right to
determine whether or not an examination is valid or invalid'").
153. Kg. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (stating, "ACT reserves the right to cancel test scores
when there is reason to believe the scores arc invalid").
154. Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 n. I (quoting the ETS's SAT bulletin provisions).
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155

regarding any challenges to the agency's determinations.
Testing booklet contracts generally present a list of options available
to a test-taker who wishes to challenge a testing agency determination.
For example, when an SAT test-taker's result "[was] questioned because
it may have been obtained unfairly," the test-taker, under the terms of the
booklet contract, was given "five options: (l) the opportunity to provide
additional information, (2) confirmation of the score by taking a free
retest, (3) authorization for [the testing agency] to cancel the score and
refund all fees, (4) third-Rarty review by any institution receiving the test
56
score or (5) arbitration."

2. The Issue ofAdhesion in Testing Contracts
A number of plaintiffs challenging testing agency determinations and
seeking to void unfavorable dispute resolution provisions in their testing
contracts have argued that standard-form agreements between testing
. an d prospective
. test-takers amount to adh eswn
. contracts. 157 At
agencies
least according to general principles of contract law, this conclusion,
158
recognized by several courts,
seems inescapable because educational
testing contracts amply meet both the generally-accepted definition of an
adhesion contract and the individual elements which constitute that
definition.
Black's Law Dictionary defines an "adhesion contract" as: "A
standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party
in a weaker ~osition, usu[ ally] a consumer, who has little choice about
1 9
No doubt, standardized testing contracts match this
the terms."
definition, since the contract booklets providing terms are prepared
unilaterally by the testing services, and the accompanying registration
forms are signed by student consumers who not only have little choice
160
but no choice at all regarding the terms of the contract.

155. E.g. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *8 (quoting an explicit provision in an ACT registration
booklet stating that the test-taker "agreed to 'abide by all procedures and requirements stated [in the
booklet], including those concerning test score cancellation and binding arbitration"').
156. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290. See also Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 n. 2 (quoting the ETS's SAT
bulletin provisions).
!57. E.g., Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *9 (rejecting a plaintiffs adhesion contract argument
under Michigan state law).
158. Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., 431 A.2d 868, 874-75 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Brady v. Dept. of'Personnel, 693 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1997); In re K.D., 386
N.Y.S.2d at 752; Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d 741, 746 (Sup. Ct. Queens County).
159. Black's Law Dictionary 318-19 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed. West 1999).
160. In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (noting that an examinee could not conceivably "indicate
to [the testing agency] that the terms contained in the Bulletin were not acceptable to him," since if
he did so, he would not be allowed to take the exam).
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A more detailed hornbook articulation of the elements implicit in the
Black's Law Dictionary definition also suggests that educational testing
contracts are contracts of adhesion:
There arc at least three distinct possibilities, which often appear in
combination [in an adhesion contract]. First, bargaining over terms may
not be between equals. The standardized contract may be used by an
enterprise with such disproportionately strong economic power that it
can dictate its terms to the weaker party. Second, there may be no
opportunity to bargain over terms at all. The standardized contract may
be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition in which the only alternatives are
adherence or outright rejection. Third, one party may be completely, or
at least relatively, unfamiliar with the terms. The standardized contract
may be used by a party who has had the advantage of time and expert
advice in preparing it while the other party may have no real
.
. .
. 161
opportumty to scrutm1ze 1t.

Upon examination, all three elements in this expanded definition closely
mirror educational testing contracts.
First, regarding the relative bargaining power of the contracting
parties, the contracting student is in a dramatically weaker position than
the testing agency. To achieve the goal of entering a particular
university, the individual student by absolute necessity must participate
162
There is generally
in the testing process and receive a favorable score.
only one game in town~the testing agency's test~by which the student
163
can achieve this goal.
By contrast, common sense suggests that the
testing agency would suffer an infinitesimally negligible loss if the
potential examinee were to choose to reject the contract booklet terms
and forego the test.
Second, the testing agency contract is offered to the potential
164
examinee on a "take it or leave it basis."
The examinee has no latitude
to cross out provisions in the booklet contract or pencil in changes. The
only choice available to the examinee is between accepting the contract
in its totality or rejecting it outright.
Third, the average test-taker no doubt reads the booklet agreement as
a set of rules to be followed rather than as a series of contract provisions
to be thoughtfully considered before approval. By contrast, the other

161. E. Allen Farnsworth & William F. Young, Cases and Materials on Contracts 396 (5th eel.
Foundation Press 1999).
162. As one court has stated, "[s]incc these exams arc required by almost all accredited
institutions, candidates have no choice but to take them on the terms olTered." !Joe, 2003 WL
2140369X at *5n. 3.
\63. In re Kn., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (noting that an examinee "could [not] contract with a
party other than the [testing agency] to take a law school aptitude test. since no such entity exists'').
164. /d.
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party to the contract, the educational testing agency, enjoys the combined
benefits of time, legal assistance, and past experience to craft the terms
of educational testing contracts to favor their interests and withstand
165
challenges under the law.
Despite these clear indications that educational testing contracts are
contracts of adhesion, many courts of appeal have not characterized them
as such, much less made a finding that thel should be "closely
16
scrutinized" or invalidated as unconscionable.
Rather, a number of
167
courts have not addressed the issue at all,
while others have
169
. d t h e a II egatton,
. 168 note d t h e tssue
.
. passmg,
·
summan·1 y d.tsmtsse
on Iy m
or rejected the claim that the adhesion contract was unenforceable under
a common law test requiring proof that the dis<futed adhesion provisions
17
themselves were substantively unreasonable.
171
In a recent case representing this last approach, Koza v. ACT,
the
Court of Appeals of Michigan ruled that under Michigan law, the
plaintiff could not meet his burden to show that an arbitration provision
in an educational testing agreement should be invalid::tted as a term of an
172
adhesion contract.
The court applied "a two-prong test of procedural
and substantive unconscionability" as follows: "I) What is the relative
bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the
165. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 266-67 (discussing how ETS carefully considers the language
of its contracts and that "public definition of the contractual rights of ETS consumers has been
judiciously avoided").
166. cy: Martin, 431 A.2d at 874-75 (stating that an ETS real estate licensing exam contract, as
"a contract of adhesion[,] must at [the] very least be closely scrutinized by the court to determine its
reasonableness").
167. Murray, 170 F.3d at 516--17 (upholding a testing contract with no discussion of the
adhesion issue); Langston, 890 F.2d at 385-g6 (rejecting a plaintiffs contract claims under Alabama
law with no mention of the adhesion issue); Corta/e, 251 A.D.2d at 529·-530 (discussing the
provisions of an ETS testing contract with no mention of the adhesion issue).
168. E.g. Scott, 600 A.2d at 503 (rejecting a motion judge's determination that both "the ETS
procedures for questioning scores and the arbitration agreement itself 'were unenforceable contracts
of adhesion."' (quoting the motion judge of the New Jersey Superior Court Chancery Division,
Bergen County)). The appellate court simply concluded that the "(p]laintiff was not compelled to
arbitrate ... [w ]hen she chose arbitration she bound herself by the arbitration agreement, including
its terms as to the scope of the arbitrator's authority and the procedures to be employed." id.
169. SC'e e.g /Joe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *5 n. 3 (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 for
the proposition that "contracts with an academic testing service 'would appear to fit the description'
of an adhesion contract," but not indicating whether or how this would affect the court's analysis).
170. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at **9-10; S<'e also In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (finding
that an educational testing contract was a contract of adhesion, recognizing that the court could use
various pretexts to invalidate its provisions if deemed unconscionable, but finding that provisions
empowering the testing agency with the right to cancel the examinee's test score if "there is a
question about its validity," and requiring the examinee to retake the test to confirm previous scores
were not "so unfair and so unreasonable" that they should be nullified or disregarded).
171. 2001 WL 1191050.
172. !d. at *10.
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alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their options?; (2) Is
173
the challenged term substantively reasonable?"
The Michigan court found that the plaintiff had "presented evidence
174
of procedural unconscionability,"
but held that the plaintiff had
"provided no authority [showing] that the [disputed arbitration] provision
175
[was] substantively unconscionable."
The court therefore concluded
that the plaintiff was bound by those provisions in the registration
materials stating that any arbitration would be conducted solely through
written submissions and limited to an inquiry into "whether [the]
defendant [testing agency] acted reasonably and in good faith in deciding
176
to cancel the [examinee's] scores."
Because courts addressing the adhesion issue have almost uniformly
refused to invalidate educational testing provisions on grounds of
unconscionability, they have either explicitly or implicitly accepted the
177
validity of educational testing contracts in their formation and terms.

3. Good Faith Adherence to the Testing Contract
Once courts have affirmed the validity of standardized testing
contracts, their attention is focused on whether the testing agency
performed the terms under minimum standards of good faith and fair
178
dealing.
Though the results of arguments based on bad faith have not
been especially fruitful, minor victories in recent cases suggest that such
arguments may still hold promise.
The legal contours of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
179
dealing, a duty owed by an¥ party to a contract,
have been described
1 0
Standards for good faith and fair dealing
as "shrouded in mystery."

173. !d. at **9- I 0.
174. !d. at *I 0.
175. !d.
176. !d. at **S, I 0. Though the Kma court agreed with the examinee that the defendant agency
could not insist on arbitration in Dallas, Texas, this was based upon the fact that the location for
arbitration was simply not a provision of the contract rather than on any unconscionability ground.
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court on this issue only, holding that arbitration should be
held in the Detroit, Michigan metropolitan area, the hometown of the examinee. !d. at **I 0-11.
177. C{: Martin, 431 A.2d at 874-75 (putting the words "agreement" and "contract" in quotes
when referring to an ETS real estate licensing exam application and booklet contract, respectively,
id. at 870, 874, and suggesting that a booklet contract provision that denied test-takers the right to
inspect their graded exams could be voided as unconscionable. !d. at 874-75).
17K Sec inji·a notes 179 -236 and accompanying text (discussing various aspects of good faith
inquiries in testing invalidation cases).
179. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291. "Implicit in all contracts is a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the course of contract performance." !d.
180. Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards .fl!r Evaluating When the

Covenant of' Good Faith and Fair Dealing !las Been Violated: A Framework fin· Resolving the
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are notoriously nebulous and many court decisions based on this
principle amount to "ad hoc" determinations "yielding inconsistent
results and depriving P.arties of the ability to predict what conduct will
181
violate the covenant."
Accordingly, some courts and legal scholars
have tried to formulate a workable framework for applying the principle
182
of good faith and fair dealing.
A full examination of these standards
would prove far too lengthy for the purposes of this article. However,
brief mention of some areas of conduct considered violative of the
covenant may be useful in the testing context.
183
In Dalton v. Educational Te.•;ting Service,
certain general
principles of good faith and fair dealing were announced by the Court of
Appeals of New York to support its decision that ETS in that case
184
The court, discussing the scope of the covenant,
violated the covenant.
declared that "[ e ]ncompassed within the implied obligation of each
promisor to exercise good faith are 'any promises which a reasonable
person in the position of the promisee would be justified in
185
understanding were included."'
The court continued, "[t]his embraces
a pledge that 'neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or il]juring the right of the other party to receive the fruits
1 6
of the contract."'
The court, defining the standard to be applied when
the contract "contemplates the exercise of discretion," stated that the
controlling party had a du!(; "not to act arbitrarily or irrationally in
1
exercising that discretion."
The court cautioned, however, that there
were limits to even this low level of scrutiny, and that no good faith
obligation could be implied that was at odds with the express terms of
188
the contract.
The approach taken by the Dalton court is characteristic of the good
faith inquiry applied by most courts in testing invalidation cases-to
determine whether the testing agency "arbitrarily or irrationally"
evaluated the facts and circumstances surrounding a cheating allegation.
Unfortunately, the issue of relative materiality of injury to the examinee

Mystery, 47 Hastings L.J. 585,585 (19%).
I 81. !d. at 586.
182. !d. at 600- 32.
183. 663 N.E.2d 289.
184. !d. at 291-92. According to this author's research, /Jai!On appears to be the only
invalidation testing case where a court made an attempt to provide the standards under which it was
making its good faith and fair dealing determination.
185. !d. at 291 (quoting Samuel Williston & George .1. Thompson, Si'lectiom from Wiffiston 's
Treatise on the raw of Contracts,~ 1293,3682 (rev. ed .. Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1938)).
186. !d. (quoting Kirk<' La Sheil<' Co. v. Armstrong Co., ISS N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933)).
187. /d.
18K /d.
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and testing agency, as well as whether options other than invalidation
were available to the testing agency, have not been part of courts' good
faith inquiry, though standards profosed by certain legal scholars
18
perhaps suggest that they should be.
Rather, courts, through the policy
arguments outlined earlier in this article, have simply provided
conclusory statements that the reputation and reliability of testing
agencies would be harmed if they were forced to release suspected test
scores. Courts have thus reasoned that agencies have no choice but to
invalidate suspected scores once they have a substantial basis for
believing them to be unfairly earned.
Meanwhile, courts rejecting plaintiffs' bad faith arguments have
invariably addressed the facts of the cases before them on an ad hoc,
standardless basis. In doing so, they have focused on the procedural
options afforded an examinee, particularly the opportunity to retest, as
well as the quality and nature of the investigation conducted by the
testing agency.
190
For example, in Johnson v. Educational Testing Service,
the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that
ETS 's decision to cancel an examinee's dramatically improved LSA T
score based upon its Test Security Office (TSO) investigation,
consideration of the examinee's proffered evidence, and discussions at
four Board meetings, "was a reasonable one, reached with deliberation in
191
good faith."
The court characterized ETS's decision-making process
as "lengthy" and noted that ETS had relied on three handwriting
analysts' opinions in coming to the conclusion that it was not the
192
examinee who sat for her test, but an imposter.
The court pointed out
that prior to ETS 's full investigation, ETS had offered the testee the
193
opportunity to "retest under special supervision."
The court further
noted that ETS had reviewed the examinee's "extensive documentation"

189. Under standards proposed by law professors Thomas Diamond and Howard Foss, a party
to a contract (defendant) violates the principle of good faith and fair dealing if he, inter alia: I)
"ha[s] reason to know that his conduct would cause plaintiff material contractual injury unless the
conduct was necessary to avoid material contractual injury to himself," Diamond & Foss, supra n.
180, at 602; 2) "engages in conduct that injures plaintiffs contractual interests if he ha[s] reason to
know that there was an alternative which would have provided him essentially the same benefits
while substantially reducing plaintiffs contractual injuries," id. at 609; or 3) dishonestly evaluates
facts or circumstances under a contract which "confers discretion upon defendant to determine
whether particular facts or circumstances exist." /d. at 615. Diamond and Foss suggest that "material
contractual injury" under this proposed standard occurs "when conduct defeats a party's essential
purpose for entering into the contract." /d. at 602.
190. 615 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1984).
191. /dat638.
192. !d.
193. /d. at 637.
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194

The district court granted summary
before coming to its conclusion.
judgment for the defendant and dismissed the breach of contract claim.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding,
relying on the same "indicia" of reasonableness and concluding "that
195
ETS went beyond the letter of its contractual promise."
196
Similarly, in Langston v. ACT,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals pointed to American College Testing's "extensive" investigation
of a high school football player's sizeable increase in his ACT score over
a previous test and the "alarming similarity" between his current test
197
answers and another examinee's.
The court emphasized that the
student had been given the orportunity to retest or submit to arbitration
19
but had refused to do so.
Thus, in granting a defense motion for
summary judgment, the court held there was "no genuine issue as to
whether ACT breached its obligation to act in good faith under the
199
contract."
However, two New York decisions mentioned above, Dalton v.
200
Educational Testing Service (1995),
and Cortale v. Educational
201
Testing Service ( 1998)
held that ETS 's failure to consider evidence
offered by examinee plaintiffs violated the covenant of good faith and
202
fair dealing.
These two relatively recent cases suggest that, on
appropriate facts, New York courts may now be willing to more closely
analyze the merits of whether the examinee actually cheated, at least in
coming to a determination as to whether the testing agenc:1 acted
0
"arbitrarily or irrationally," in making its invalidation decision?
In Dalton, the New York Court of Appeals quoted with approval the
trial judge's decision that the ETS Board of Review breached its
contractual good faith obligations when it "failed 'to make even
rudimentary efforts to evaluate or investigate the information' furnished

194. !d. at 638.
195. Johnson v. Educ. Testing Serv .. 754 F.2d 20, 26 (I st Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Johnson II).
The court used colorful language in affirming the summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs
claim, stating, "a plaintiff cannot force a trial by pointing to smoke but not fire, and '[h]ere we do
not even see any smoke."' !d. (quoting Packish v. McMurtrie, 697 F.2d 23,27 (1st Cir. 1983)). The
court went further, stating that "[w]hile Johnson 'is entitled to all favorable inferences, [s]hc is not
entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture.'" !d.
(quoting Manganaro v. De laval Separator Co., 309 F.2d 389, 393 (I st Cir. 1962)).
196. 890 F.2d 380.
197. !d. at 386.
198. /d.
199. !d.
200. 663 N.E.2d 289.
201. 674 N.Y.S.2d 753.
202. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289 at 291; Cor/ale, 251 A.D.2d at 529-530.
203. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289 at 293.
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204

by [the suspected examinee] .... "
Though the examinee presented
verification that he was ill with mononucleosis during his first poor SAT
showing, as well as eyewitness statements that he was actually in the
.
c
.
d secon d test, 205 assertwns
.
testmg
room 10r
the questwne
amp 1y
206
supported by detailed and highly compelling evidence,
the trial court
207
found that the ETS Board completely ignored these proofs.
According
to the trial court, ETS deemed evidence confirming the examinee's
presence at his second SAT exam to be "irrelevant" because it viewed
the examinee's "discrepant scores" between the two tests and alleged
handwriting discrepancies to be sufficient proof that the examinee had
208
achieved the scores unfairly.
Consequently, ETS concluded that the

204. 663 N.E.2d at 291 (quoting Dalton, 5SH N.Y.S.2d at 745).
205. !d.
206. The trial court detailed the impressive proofs the suspected examinee submitted to ETS 's
internal investigation as follows:
[The testee] informed ETS that he had been ill with mononucleosis during the [first]
examination and submitted evidence of his academic abilities: that he had maintained an
average of X5 and received second honors while at [his high school]. He also informed ETS
that he had completed a test preparation or coaching course and he submrtted to ETS the
diagnostic tests administered by the Princeton Review, a "coaching course" in verbal, math and
SAT test-taking skills which he attended in the period between the two examinations. Those
diagnostic tests indicated test results consistent with his subsequent performance on the
[second. challenged] SAT.
To support his denial that an imposter had taken the [second] SAT. [the examinee]
fumished ETS with the report of a document examiner retained by [his] family who,
disagreeing with the ETS examiner, found that [the examinee's] handwriting matched both the
May and November SAT examination sheets. Submitted to the test security office was the
statement of the ETS paid proctor who supervised the administration of the SAT in the
classroom assigned to [the examinee] ... the proctor informed ETS that she specifically
recognized [the examinee] at a subsequent meeting, arranged by the ETS SAT test
administrator ... as being present in the classroom on [the second test date]. She recalled his
photo identification card. . and remembered having reprimanded him for talking during a
break in the examination. She also recalled [his family name] ... [and] further informed ETS in
her statement that [the examinee] had recognized her at this subsequent meeting and was able
to detail her unique classroom instructions and procedures, including her requirement that
students sign the roster sheet in her presence beside their printed names.
The proctor's statement was accompanied by the statements of two students who also
identified [the examinee] as being the person in the classroom on the day of the exam. One
student. previously unacquainted with [the examinee], specifically stated that [the examinee]
had stood out in the classroom that day because he was fair-complexioned and blue-eyed and
exhibited "an attitude", while the majority of the other test takers were Asian, AfricanAmerican or Hispanic. The statement by the ETS paid SAT test administrator ... confirmed
that the examinee had correctly identified the proctor from other individuals present at the
subsequent meeting. Lastly, [the examinee] offered to submit to a lie-detector test. at his own
expense, and to have his fingerprints taken and compared to those latent fingerprints which
ought to be found on the second answer sheet and test booklet.
Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46.
207.

Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291.

208. !d.
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testee plaintiff "could [only] controvert the Board's preliminary finding
209
that the [second improved] score was invalid ... by taking a retest."
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' finding
that ETS's refusal to properly consider relevant evidence was a breach of
its contractual duty of good faith, and therefore mandated specific
performance, it nonetheless "differ[ed] as to the scope of the relief'
210
provided by the lower courts.
While the trial court directed ETS to
release the examinee's challenged score, and the Appellate Division
211
affirmed,
the Court of Appeals refused to do so. The court concluded
that the plaintiff was only due the specific performance accorded him
under the contract-"good faith consideration of the material he
212
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
submitted to ETS."
this was "an empty exercise" rather than a meaningful remedy and that
ETS would simply "rubber stamp its ~rior determination without good2 3
faith attention to his documentation. "
The court pointed to provisions
in the examinee's contract which provided him with the options of
"third-party review by any institution receiving the test score as well as
214
arbitration," ifETS once more rejected his explanations.
If one looks beyond the surface of the Dalton decision, a fair reading
is that the examinee plaintiffs "victory" was a loss. Though the court
suggested that the examinee plaintiff would still have viable options if
ETS once again refused to change its opinion, this is doubtful. First, it is
highly unlikely that the examinee would wish to submit his case to a
university inquiry for the obvious reason that this would defeat the
purpose of his challenge-to prevent ETS from damaging his college
prospects. And, as noted earlier in this article, his other option,
arbitration, would be limited to a determination only on whether ETS had
a substantial basis for challenging the scores, a low burden for ETS to
meet. Thus, as a result of the court's decision, not only would the
plaintiff be accorded no forum in which to clear his name, but also would
quite likely end up having his score invalidated. On the whole then, the
outcome in Dalton was not particularly encouraging for testing
invalidation plaintiffs.
Dalton may also be a negative case for plaintiffs in that the court
provided key limiting language accompanying the partial relief it
granted. In particular, the court emphasized that, according to the testing

209. !d.
210. !d. at 291.
211. !d.
212. !d. at 294.
213. !d. at 291.
214. !d.
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contract, "ETS was under no duty, express or implied, to initiate an
215
Additionally, the court
external investigation into a questioned score."
stressed that "[n]othing in the contract compelled ETS to prove that the
test-taker cheated," and that any such requirement "would be inconsistent
with the contractual language placing the burden squarel1 on the test16
The court
taker to overcome the ETS finding of score invalidity."
pointedly noted that the trial judge had declined to decide the issue of
whether or not the examinee himself actually took the test, in essence,
17
whether or not he cheated?
By contrast, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division's
Cortale opinion contains no such limiting language. In Cortale, a GRE
testee improved the verbal portion of her score across successive tests by
more than two hundred points, raising ETS's red flags and prompting a
218
preliminary investigation.
Based upon a statistical analysis comparing
her answers to another test-taker's, who "may have been seated near
her," ETS came to the conclusion that the Cortale plaintiff had copied
19
After being accused of cheating, the
her co-examinee's answers?
220
but ETS
plaintiff submitted considerable exculpatory evidence,
221
declined to change its determination.
In the meantime the plaintiff
22
had been accepted to a graduate university program?
When ETS
notified the examinee plaintiff that it intended to inform her university
that it was canceling her GRE score, the examinee brought suit seeking a
permanent injunction restraining cancellation and a declaratory judgment
23
validating her score? ETS filed a cross motion for summary ju~ment
dismissing the complaint, which was denied by the trial court? The
plaintiff won a preliminary injunction pending a final determination of
the matter and ETS brought an appeal on the denial of summary
.
,
225
JUdgment only.
The Appellate Division upheld the trial court's ruling denying ETS

215.
216.
217.

21 K
219.

!d. at 292.
/d. at 292.
!d. at 2'14.
Cortale. 25 I A.D.2d at 528.
!d.
!d. For example, the examinee submitted evidence to ETS showing that she had sutTcrcd

220.
an injury to her hand prior to the first examination for which »he was taking a prescription narcotic
for pain. Additionally. she offered evidence showing that her academic abilities were more
consistent with the higher scores she achieved on her second examination. !d.

!d.
Cortale, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
223. !d.; Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 529.

221.
222.

224. !d.
225.

/d.
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In markedly different language from its Yaeger
summary judgment.
227
decision eight years earlier,
the court began its analysis by bluntly
proclaiming, "ETS, in reliance upon purely circumstantial evidence,
228
determined that the plaintiff was guilty of cheating."
The court,
denying summary judgment, held that a question of fact existed because
ETS based its determination "largely upon a statistical analysis of [a]
pattern of erasures and incorrect answers appearing on the plaintiffs
answer sheet," and the plaintiff presented "expert evidence which
229
attacked those statistical analytical methods as unreliable."
Moreover,
the court noted that one of the studies submitted by ETS, "ostensibly in
support of its motion" actually called into question the reliability of
ETS's own investigative policies, suggesting that ETS tended to ignore
submissions offered by examinees in support of their questioned
230
scores.
The Cortale opinion, though providing helpful language for testing
plaintiffs, should not be overestimated. The court ruled solely on the
appro~riateness of summary judgment dismissing the good faith
31
claim,
as orposed to the Dalton court which ruled on the good faith
23
claim itself.
Thus, the Cortale court was not compelled to reconfirm
the limited remedies available to a test-taker showing breach of good
faith by the testing agency-further investigation, third-party review by
the plaintiffs chosen university, or arbitration. Nonetheless, the court
nowhere suggested, even in dicta, that the underlying issue was only
233
whether ETS had a substantial basis for challenging the score.
On the
contrary, the court referenced "the plaintiffs efforts to clear her name
234
and prove her entitlement to her score."
Moreover, the court, breaking with the tradition of earlier testing
invalidation cases, stressed the interests of the test-taker, departing from
well-worn policy mantras advocating deference to testing agencies. The
court used strong language in this regard, citing "the serious educational
and vocational ramifications that may flow from a finding that the
235
plaintiff cheated."
Though this last statement was made in response to
egregious facts that ETS destroyed the examinee's test booklet
ld.
227. Supra nn. 126-128 and accompanying text.
228. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530.
229. !d.
230. !d.
231. ld.
232. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291-··95.
233. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d 528.
234. ld. at 530.
235. !d.
226.
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containing scratch work that might have substantiated her innocence,
it nonetheless stood as an indicator that under appropriate facts,
deference to the testing agency might give way to sympathetic
consideration of the examinee's interests.
Cortale notwithstanding, even if the testing agency is compelled by
its duty of good faith to honestly consider all of the plaintiffs proffered
evidence, the nature and scope of an invalidation inquiry will be limited
to the options outlined in the booklet registration materials. This means
that a suspected examinee may never be able to obtain a judgment on the
underlying grounds for an invalidation-the accusation of cheating. As
one court succinctly put it, "The issue before this court is not whether or
not [the examinee] cheated on the test; the issue is whether or not [the
237
testing agency] could refuse to release the score."
Or as another court
stated, "Under the governing law, the outcome of plaintiffs case does
not turn on whether or not plaintiff cheated on his exam, but only on
whether or not ~the testing agency] carried out its contractual obligations
2 8
in good faith."

B. Deprivation of Due Process Claims
Perhaps not surprisingly, the narrow framing of the legal inquiry
under contract law has led a number of plaintiffs to allege violations of
their due process rights. These arguments likewise are generally
unsuccessful, as many courts fail to classify testing agency conduct as
state action subject to due process. In some instances, courts have
acknowledged that testing agencies may be state actors; however,
because of deference to testing agencies, courts are still likely to rule that
testing agency conduct satisfies the demands of due process.
The benchmark due process case in educational testing invalidation

236. !d. ETS not only destroyed the suspected examinee's booklet but also that of "Candidate
B" who the examinee had allegedly copied from. Cortale, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156. The destruction of
this evidence alone was a sufficient ground for the trial court to find that a question of fact existed as
to whether ETS investigated in good faith:
The question of destruction of evidence was not addressed by the [New York Court of Appeals]
in Dalton or other similar cases. Defendant has asserted that all test booklets are destroyed in
the normal course of its business. Although litigation had not been commenced in connection
with the examination (at the time the materials were destroyed) the propriety of destroying
material which is arguably relevant to an ongoing investigation and a future arbitration
proceeding (provided in the contract) is, at best, questionable. At the very least, this Court finds
that it creates a triable issue as to defendant's good faith efforts in discharging its obligation to
fully investigate the question of plaintiffs academic dishonesty. Accordingly, the cross-motion
for summary judgment must be denied.
!d. at 157.
237.
238.

Crow v. Educ. TestingServ., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18191 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 1982).
Langston, 890 F.2d at 385 n. 9.
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In Johnson, the First
law is Johnson v. Educational Testing Service.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a test-taker accused by ETS of having
an imposter sit for her LSA T exam failed to state a viable due process
24
Consequently,
claim against ETS under the Fourteenth Amendment.
the First Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to
41
ETS, and affirmed the dismissal of the examinee's due process claim?
The First Circuit explained that in order for the plaintiff to present a
cognizable violation of due process, she would first have to establish that
242
"ETS [was] a state actor and that its conduct was state action."
The
court noted that under Supreme Court law, the Fourteenth Amendment
provided no protection against wrongful or discriminatory private
43
conduct? Thus, a plaintiff alleging a violation of due process would
have to show that the defendant's actions '"caus[ ed] the de;Brivation of a
44
The court
federal right [that was] fairly attributable to the State."'
further explained that its "state action inquiry [was] two-fold: (I)
whether 'the deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State [was] responsible,' and (2)
whether 'the party charged with the deprivation [was] a person who may
245
Therefore, according to this dual
fairly be said to be a state actor. "'
inquiry, even if a defendant were held to be a state actor, his actions
. b
.
246
wou ld not necessan 1y e state actwns.
The plaintiff argued that ETS was a state actor because by
administering the LSA T, "a prerequisite to admission to all law schools,"
the agency "exercise[ d] virtual veto power" over which applicants would
47
be admitted to those law schools, many of them state institutions? The
plaintiff further argued that under ETS's contract with the Law School
Admissions Council (LSAC), the LSAC retained "ultimate
responsibility" for the content and administration of the LSAT, and
248
consulted with ETS regarding the overall "conduct of the program."
Finally, the plaintiff pointed out that 45% of LSAC member schools
were state institutions, and that a number of trustees on the ETS board
were either public officials or "representatives of bodies that included

°

239. Johnson 11, 754 F.2d 20.
240. !d. at 23.
241. !d. at 25.
242. !d. at 23.
243. !d.
244. !d. (quoting /,ugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 ( 1982)).
245. !d. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
246. !d
247. !d.
24X. !d. at 23 -24.
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,249
. . . .
pu bl IC mstltutwns.
The First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs arguments that ETS was a
state actor. Although admitting that the plaintiffs "conception of state
action was arguably tenable when her complaint was filed" (prior to a
250
it concluded that recent Supreme Court
lengthy hiatus in district court)
holdings set standards for finding state action that were "fatal to her
251
.
252
theory."
The court rehed on Blum v. Yaretsky
and Rendell v.
253
Baker,
in which the Supreme Court held that a nursing home and
private school, respectively, were not engaged in state action despite the
fact that an overwhelming amount of their funds were derived from
54
The First Circuit quoted Rendell-Eaker as
government coffers?
follows:

The school, like the nursing homes [in Blum], is not fundamentally
different from many private corporations whose business depends
primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or
submarines for the government. Acts of such private contractors do not
become acts of the government by reason of t~ei5 significant or even
5
total engagement in performing public contracts.
256

The court then noted that the Fourth Circuit, in Arlosoro.Jfsv. NCAA,
57
had recently held that the NCAA was not a state actor,
because in
light of the Supreme Court's Rendell-Eaker and Blum holdings, indirect
state involvement was no longer enough to convert private activity into
58
state action? The First Circuit reasoned that if the NCAA, with half of
its members state or federal institutions, was not a state actor, then a
259
The court opined, "Whereas the
fortiori, ETS was not a state actor.
NCAA is capable of disqualifying an athlete from intercollegiate
competition, ETS merely reports test scores and lacks authority to decide
260
who shall be admitted and who shall be rejected."
249. !d. at 24.
250. !d. at 27. The court made reference to the fact that ETS's motion for summary judgment
had been "left pending by the district court for a long period of time," indicating a lapse of more than
twelve years. !d.
251. !d. at 24.
252. 457 U.S. 91 ( 1982).
253. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
254. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 24.
255. /d. (quoting Rende/1-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840--41) (alteration in original).
256. 746F.2d 1019, 1020(4thCir.1984).
257. The Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, later held that the NCAA did not engage in
state action when it promulgated rules that a state university, unquestionably a state actor, followed
when suspending its college basketball coach. 488 U.S. 179, 193-94 (1988).
258. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 24.
259. !d.
260. !d. (internal citation omitted).
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The court concluded its analysis by finding that "the formulation,
grading, and reporting of standardized tests [was] not an exclusive public
261
and that the examinee plaintiff had presented no evidence
function,"
"that public institutions belo~~ng to ETS took the lead in instigating the
conduct she challenge[d]."
Therefore, the court held that the
examin~e's due process argument could not overcome the hifther
63
standard for state action set by the Supreme Court's recent decisions.
The Johnson court, however, cautioned in a footnote that its decision
did not mean that ETS could never be deemed a state actor engaged in
64
state activity? The court noted that in Martin v. Educational Testing
265
Service,
in which ETS administered real estate licensing exams and
admitted that it acted as an agent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
266
.
ETS was found to be a state actor.
The court also ctted Golden Rule
267
.
Insurance Co. v. lVlat
'" h.zas,
.
1·tcensure
Lt•-r
m
w h.tc h an msurance
1e
examinee was able to state a claim meriting a trial on violation of due
process. The Golden Rule plaintiff alleged "that ETS designed
examinations for licensure of insurance agents and brokers, graded
26
examinations, determined who passed, and printed state licenses." R
The court in Golden Rule deemed this activity sufficient to show that the
defendant ETS was engaged in state action and that the plaintiffs due
269
process claim could go forward.
The First Circuit's footnote qualification was apparently ignored by
270
Eight
at least one federal court piggybacking on the Johnson decision.
years after Johnson, the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina boldly and erroneously stated in a testing invalidation
271
case, Tolleson v. Educational Testing Service,
that "[t]he case law is
uniform in holding there is no due process violation when the ETS
reports test scores to state agencies. Neither the ETS's acting alone nor
operating in concert with the state or state agencies constitutes the

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

/d. at 25.
!d.
!d.
/d. at 25 n. 2.
431 A.2d at 871 n. 7.
Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 25 n. 2.
408 N.E.2d 310 (lll. App. 4th Dist. 1980).
Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 25 n. 2.
Golden Rule, 408 N.E.2d at 317.
270. See Tolleson, 832 F. Supp. at 158, 161 (D.S.C. 1992). The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina characterized the Johnson opinion as '"the seminal case, which is very
similar to the case at bar." !d.
271. 832 F. Supp. 158.
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Though it relied heavily on Johnson, the
requisite 'state action. "'
Tolleson court apparently chose to disregard the Johnson footnote,
sweeping Martin and Golden Rule under the rug.
This was a significant omission by the district court, because for the
purposes of its state action inquiry, the facts of Tolleson resembled those
of Martin and Golden Rule, at least to the extent that the testee sought
admission to a profession for which a standardized ETS test was the sole
273
avenue for admission.
In Tolleson, an examinee wishing to teach
social studies in South Carolina failed the National Teacher's Exams in
that subject four times, but on his fifth attempt improved his score by two
274
hundred points and was flagged by ETS for cheating.
In bringing a
due process claim against ETS and the South Carolina Department of
Education under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the examinee averred "that the State
of South Carolina, through the Department of Education and [the
relevant state statute] empowered ETS to act with the full authority of the
275
state."
The district court, rejecting the plaintiffs due process claim,
admitted that the South Carolina "statute provide[d] that applicants
seeking to teach in South Carolina [had to] take the NTE and that the
276
ETS [was] the entity charged with reporting the test scores."
Nonetheless, the court found that "ETS [was] a mere vehicle for
reporting information; the ETS act[ ed] only as a medium for conveying
examination results. The ETS [had] no authority to determine
certification or make any judgments as to the qualifications of
.
,277
app I1cants.
Not only did the Tolleson court ignore Martin, Golden Rule, and the
First Circuit's footnote pertaining to them, but it also failed to consider
key language in the district court's Johnson opinion, undisturbed by the
First Circuit on appeal, that distinguished Martin and Golden Rule.
Specifically, the district court in Johnson stated that Martin and Golden
Rule
involved examinations administered by ETS for state licensing
authorities which were the sole requirement for and the sole method of
obtaining a real estate and insurance broker's license, respectively, for
practice in the state .... Here ETS's role [in administering the LSAT]
more closely resembles [another standardized testing case], where
satisfactory performance ... was only one requirement of several for

272.

273.

/d. at 164.
/d. at 15R-59.

/d. at 159.
/d. at 160.
276. !d. at 160 n. R.
277. /d. at 161.
274.

275.
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those seeking to be high school P{~~cipals, an oral examination and
experience being necessary as well.

Clearly this language at least bore consideration by the Tolleson court,
since the NTE administered by ETS in Tolleson was "a prerequisite to
certification" that all applicants had to pass in order to teach a given
279
subject.
Moreover, the court pointed to no other qualifications or
testing requirements essential to obtain teaching certification.
The District Court for the District of South Carolina also failed to
280
consider Scott v. Educational Testing Service,
a case factually on
point and decided just eight months before Tolleson, in which the
assumption that ETS conduct rises to the level of state action is implicit.
In Scott, a New York temporary public school teacher who received
passing scores on her NTE came under suspicion by ETS, which
concluded that the examinee had copied her answers on two sections of
281
the exam from another test-taker.
After being offered various options
by ETS, the examinee chose to submit to arbitration, but requested an
82
oral hearing in order to fully defend herself against the accusations?
The arbitrator refused the request for an oral hearing and then decided
against the examinee, ruling that ETS was free to cancel the suspected
283
NTE scores.
The examinee then filed an action to vacate the
arbitration award, alleging violations of due process and including a
84
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? On the return by ETS of
an order to show cause why the arbitration award should not be vacated
and the examinee's NTE scores reinstated, the motion judge ruled that
"ETS was obligated to afford plaintiff due process because it was 'acting
as an agent of New York City and the New York licensing
285
authority. "'
The judge found that the terms of the testing contract and
286
arbitration agreement were '"unenforceable contracts of adhesion"'
and that they violated the test-taker's due process rights because they did
not afford the test-taker the opportunity to contest the underlying charge
287
of cheating.
The judge then "vacated the award and ordered that a
'new in-person oral arbitration' be conducted in which ETS would have

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 635 n. 5.
Tolleson, 832 F. Supp. at 158-59.
Scott, 600 A.2d 500.
Scott, 600 A.2d at 50 I.
/d. at 502.

/d.
/d.
/d. at 502-03 (quoting the trial court without citation).
/d. at 503 (quoting the trial court without citation).
/d. at 50 I.
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the burden of establishing that plaintiff had in fact cheated."
ETS was
289
granted both leave to appeal and a stay on the trial court's order.
The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the
trial court, holding that the examinee was not denied due process because
her "interests [were] fairly accommodated by a procedure which
permit[ted] ETS to cancel scores upon an adequate showing of
substantial question as to their validity, without any necessity for a
290
showing of actual cheating or other misconduct."
However, in order to
reach the merits of the due process issue, the court "assume[ d), without
deciding, that ETS 's conduct was 'state action' subject to the due process
291
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
In marked contrast to
Tolleson's statement that the case law was "uniform" on the issue, the
court observed that other courts had come to "variant results" as to
whether national testing agencies were involved in state action
292
depending on the facts of individual cases.
The court noted, however,
that those precedents were not determinative since the court would not be
93
deciding the issue of state action based upon the trial record?
Ultimately, the court concluded that ETS 's procedures satisfied due
process on policy grounds. The court added a new wrinkle to standard
policy refrains on maintaining testing reliability by asserting that the
examinee's interests actually overlapped with the testing agency's, since
the examinee's "effort to preserve her score [was] bottomed on the
294
proposition that they [were] presumptively reliable."
Citing
impressive statistical evidence provided by ETS showing an infinitesimal
chance that the examinee's scores were properly earned, the court
declared, "Proof of wrongdoing is one way of establishing unreliability;
but if unreliability is otherwise shown, an absence of proof as to how it
295
came about is of no matter."
Concluding its due process/policy
analysis, the court quoted from Langston v. ACT on the impracticality of
requiring a testing agency to show that an examinee actually cheated:
To demand that ACT prove by eyewitness testimony that an individual
cheated before invalidating a score would undermine ACT's primary
function of providing colleges with scores that are highly reliable. ACT
could not possibly catch every student who cheats in its exams if it had

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at
at
at
at

50 I (quoting the trial court without citation).
503.
504.
503 (citing f(Jrkanian, 488 U.S. 179; Blum, 457 U.S. 991 ).

293. !d.
294. !d. at 504.
295. !d.
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to produce an eye witness [sic] to confirm every instance of
.
duct. 296
m1scon

In spite of its ultimate conclusion, Scott showed that even after the
Supreme Court's Rendell-Eaker and Blum decisions, a court could
entertain the possibility that ETS, at least in a licensing exam, was
sufficiently involved in state action that its investigation and arbitration
conduct would have to accord due process to an examinee. The Supreme
Court's more recent 5-4 decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
297
Secondary School Athletic Assn.,
in which the majority held that a
state interscholastic athletic association's regulatory enforcement activity
298
was state action,
apparently has not foreclosed this possibility.
Justice Souter's Brentwood opinion could be seen as widening the
permissible state action inquiry beyond a more narrow analysis
predicated on criteria developed from a limited number of the Court's
299
cases.
The Brentwood majority "identified a host of facts that [could]
bear on the fairness of [ ] an attribution [of state action] . . . for
example . . . exercise 'of coercive power,' . . . [or] when the State
provides 'significant encouragement, either overt or covert,' ... when a
private actor operates as a 'willful participant in joint activity with the
State or its agents ... when it is controlled by an 'agency of the state,'
when it has been delegated a public function by the State, when it is
'entwined with governmental policies,' or when government is 'entwined
.m [.Its ] management an d contro I.,3oo
The Supreme Court's cases suggest that a proper state action analysis
of whether a testing agency's invalidation of an examinee's test results
(in the most likely context, a state licensing exam) amounted to state
action, would likely review closely a number of key factors. Did the
testing agency, in addition to designing an examination for state
licensure to a particular profession and grading that examination,
determine who passed, and even print the state licenses, as the court
296. !d. at 505 (quoting Langston, 890 F.2d at 386).
297. 531 U.S.288(2001).
298. !d. at 298.
299. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that that court,
although recognizing "that there [was] no single test to identify state actions and state actors [, ]
applied three criteria derived from Blum ... Lugar ... and Rende/1-Bakcr ... and found no state
action under any of them." !d. at 294 (citations omitted). The three factors applied by the circuit
court were whether there was a "symbiotic relationship between the State and the Association,"
whether the Association was engaged "in a traditional and exclusive public function," and whether
the Association was "responding to state compulsion." !d.
300. !d. (citations omitted, alterations added, except last) (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at I 004;
f_ugar, 457 U.S. at 941; Pa. v. Bd. ofDirs. of" City Trusts of Phi/a., 353 U.S. 230, 231 ( 1957); West v.
Atkins, 487 US. 42, 56 ( 1988); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co, 500 U.S. 614, 627-628 ( 1991 );
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,299,301 (1966)).
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301

noted m Golden Rule,
or could it be deemed a "mere vehicle for
reporting information ... [with] no authority to determine certification or
make any judgments as to the qualifications of applicants," as the court
302
found in Tolleson'?
Potential factors, perhaps relevant in determining
the degree of "entwinement" between the activities of the state and the
testing agency in a given case might be: whether a passing score on the
standardized test was the only requirement and only method for
determining whether the examinee could be licensed for a profession
within the state; whether the state interacted with the testing agency in
designing the exam or had a hand in shaping its content; whether the test
was formulated for a particular state's licensing process or was a
"generic" national exam, such as the Multi-State Bar Examination
303
(MBE);
or whether the testing agency or the state itself administered
the test.
In the final analysis, however, it seems unlikely, based on testing law
to date, that a plaintiff in an invalidation case can succeed on a due
process claim, even if that claim survives dismissal and is reviewed on
the merits, as in Scott. The Scott decision indicates that, absent some
major shift away from the traditional deference paid testing agencies by
the courts, and a concomitant standard that those agencies only need
show a substantial basis for invalidating an examinee's score, testing
invalidation procedures established and implemented by testing agencies

301. 408N.E.2dat317.
302. 832 F. Supp. at 161.
303. In lfoover v. Runwin, an interesting testing case, an unsuccessful bar examinee sued the
Arizona Supreme Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions, alleging, inter alia, that
members of the commission had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain trade by
reducing the number of attorneys who could practice law in the state. 466 U.S. 558, 565 ( 1989). The
U.S. Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the denial of the examinee's application for the
Arizona Bar was ultimately the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and thus the doctrine of
sovereign immunity applied to the state action of the Committee, rendering proper the dismissal of
the examinee's claim. !d. at 581-82. The dissent recognized that the Arizona Supreme Court had
"delegated to [the Committee] the task of administering the bar exam, and retained the authority to
review or revise any action taken by" the Committee, but argued that those factors were insufficient
to confer immunity on the Committee under the Sherman Act. !d. at 593-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although the Court did not address whether ETS, which reported the multi-state portion of the exam,
was a state actor, it did provide an explanation of the scaling process conducted by ETS, which was
at the heart of the examinee's complaint-- i.e., that there was not a pre-set number of questions that
an examinee had to get right to succeed on the exam, but a number determined after the test was
"scaled," a process "viewed as the fairest" by ETS. !d. at 570. The Court quoted from material
published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, which stated that, in order to ensure "the
same level of competence from test to test," tests needed to be scaled, "since the level of difficulty
varie[d] from test to test." !d. (quoting the Bar Examiner's Handbook 61-62 (2d ed. 1980)). The
Handbook further explained that it was a "statistical analysis on [ ] reused questions [that]
determine[ d) how many points [were] to be added to or subtracted from the raw score to provide an
applicant's scaled score." /d.
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are likely to continue to pass constitutional muster.

VI.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PREVAILING JUDICIAL APPROACH TO
INVALIDATION CASES

Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel qf their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
304
And makes me poor indeed.
Testing invalidation cases are complex disputes involving many
factors, not least of which is the weighing of equities between the
reputation of the test-taker and the reputation of the testing agency.
Unfortunately for test-takers, courts have long emphasized the interests
of testing agencies without a corresponding nod to suspected test -takers'
interests. The likely reason for this is that ETS and ACT are hugely
influential corporations with carefully-crafted beneficent and infallible
305
images
that influence educational policymaking at all levels of
306 A
. that, as a ~1Unct10n
.
. .
government.
not her reason IS
o f stare deczszs,
courts reviewing invalidation determinations have tended to parrot the
policy statements of prior court opinions, without considering whether
fresh evidence and social research may have eroded the assumptions
underlying those policy positions.
A closer look at the standardized testing environment reveals that a
number of key assumptions made by courts in forming their opinions
may be based on fallacies. Perhaps the most important of these

304. William Shakespeare, Othello, in The Complete Works of'Shakespeare X36, act 3, sc. 3, II.
155--61 (Shakespeare Head Press cd., Barnes and Noble 1994).
305. See Naim, supra n. 97, at 276 (noting that despite ETS's gross inefficiencies in servicing
examinee consumers, an ETS public relations director managed to turn a mechanical error blamed
on a "crinkle in the comer" of an SAT testee's paper into an opportunity to tout publicly that "'to
[this director's) knowledge it was the first time a mechanical error interfered with the accuracy of
computer corrections at the 31-year old testing service, which processes 12 million pieces of paper a
year."' !d. (quoting In Short: Wrinkled hy a Crinkle, Newsday 2 (July 31. 1979)). This infallible
image has very recently suffered great damage as the result of widespread, substantial errors ETS
made in scoring the Praxis teacher-certification exam, and Pearson Educational Measurement made
in scoring the October, 2005 SAT exam. See lnji·a text accompanying nn. 344--348.
306. See inf"ra n. 308 (discussing the current ETS President and CEO's efforts to lobby
Congress on behalf of the No Child Left Behind Act); see also Lemann, supra n. II (describing
numerous situations in which ETS sought to influence government policy in regard to education and
testing); Nairn, supra n. 97, at 278-302 (describing ETS's success in maintaining a non-profit status
that allows it to elude almost any fom1 of government oversight in conducting its operations).
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assumptions are that: I) testing agencies are altruistic non-profits whose
primary purpose is to serve education and the public good; 2) testing
agencies' sole motive in invalidating scores is to maintain the integrity of
scores relied upon by colleges, employers, and licensing institutions; 3)
testing agency internal investigations are thorough and can be relied
upon; 4) suspected examinees' interests are not seriously damaged by
invalidations, and in any event test-takers are offered the option to
simply retest and confirm their scores; and 5) invalidating large score
increases is an effective safeguard against cheating. The following
section examines these suspect assumptions.
A. Testing Agencies' Status as Altruistic Non-Profits Serving the Public
Good
Contrary to popular characterization of testing agencies as altruistic
non-profits serving the public good, standardized testing is very big
business. This past year, ETS, the world's leading testing agency, earned
307
a record one hi/lion dollars in revenues.
No doubt, ETS did not earn
this astounding figure merely by fulfilling obligations to test fairly and
accurately, but by aggressively pursuing emerging markets and by
seeking to promote the influence oftesting in society.
As an example, in 200 I, ETS lobbied Congress in favor of President
308
George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind proposal.
Soon after, ETS
boosted its overall yearly dollar revenues by 200 to 250 million dollars
upon capturing a significant portion of the emerging K-12 testing market
309
created by passage of the Act.
The testing service's subsidiary "ETS
K-12 Works," which has benefited so handsomely from this huge boom
in K -12 standardized testing, is a for-profit corporation, as are two other
310
.
ETS sub SI'd'Iary corporatiOns.

307. Interview by Marketplace, "Student Testing" (Minnesota Public Radio Mar. 26, 2004)
(electronic recording, transc. on tile with the author) (available at http://www.marketplace.org/
play/audio.php?media=/morning_report/2004/03/26_mktmorn0850&start=00:00:04:32.0&end=OO:O
0:07:50.6) (interviewing ETS president and CEO Kurt M. Landgraf). This approximately doubles
ETS 's revenues since 2002, when it earned 500 million in revenues. !d.
308. See H.R. Subcomm. on Educ. Reform of the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce,
Hearings on Measuring Success: Using Assessments and Accountability to Raise Student
Achievem<:nt,
I 07th
Con g.
(Mar.
8,
200 I)
(available
at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/ I 07th/edr/ account380 1/landgraf.htm) [hereinafter Landgraf
Educational Testimony]. Testifying before the House Education Reform Subcommittee, ETS
President and CEO Kurt M. Landgraf opined, "I believe in the President's plan. It is the right thing
for our country, and it is doable." !d.
309. Interview by Marketplace, supra n. 307. According to Landgraf, this newfound market
now constitutes "about twenty percent" of ETS's overall revenue. /d.
310. See Landgraf Educational Testimony, supra n. 308 (recording Landgrafs testimony that
ETS has "three for-profit subsidiary corporations. The Chauncey Group International develops and
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As further evidence of this big business bent, one need merely
consider the types of people attracted to serve on the boards of directors
of these testing agencies, along with their impressive compensation
packages. Though testing agenc~ heads have historically been well3 1
compensated for their efforts,
recent pay scales are still more
impressive. Kurt Landgraf, who took over as president and CEO of ETS
in 2000, received almost $800,000 in compensation for his first ten
months on the job, and the corporation has doled out giant bonuses to
312
other officers and employees as well.
Mr. Landgraf, a former CEO of
DuPont Pharmaceuticals, typifies the new leadership at ETS-once "an
entity staffed mostly by academics" but one that is now "run by
313
executives recruited from the corporate world."
The incentive pay systems instituted by these executives are raising
some eyebrows and callin,r into question the continued non-profit status
31
of the ETS corporation.
According to tax experts, it can be improper
for a non-fJrofit to "[cash] out most of its excess revenues in the form of
15
bonuses."
Critics have charged that large incentive bonuses are
particularly improper when they are derived from the fees raid by
31
examinees who are captives of the standardized testing system.
Further reinforcing the big business bent of testing agencies,
competitors recognize that ETS may be benefiting unfairly by avoiding
317
taxes and oversight from regulatory agencies.
As John Katzman, CEO
of Princeton Review put it, in characterizing the College Board and
administers occupational certification and professional assessment programs. ETS Technologies is
devoted to developing and advancing technologies to support on-line learning and assessment
applications. Our third subsidiary, called ETS K-12 Works, was created to provide testing and
measurement services to the nation's elementary and secondary schools").

311. In 199R, the President of ETS earned $467.481 plus $49,664 in deferred compensation.
Patricia McAdie & Erika Shaker, Putting ETS to the Test, I Corp. Profiles (newsletter of the
Ctr.
for
Policy
Alts.)
I
(June
20,
200 I)
(available
at
Canadian
http://www .pol icyalternatives.ca!documents/ National_Officc_Pubs/ets. pdf).
312. Tamar Lewin, Corporate Culture and Big Pay Come to Nonprofit Testing Service, N.Y.
Times AI (Nov. 23, 2002).
This is a billion-dollar commercial entity," Mr. Landgraf said. "We're an organization with a
very strong social mission, but we are also a very large commercial enterprise. Our
compensation is based on the simple principle that we have to attract people who can help us
grow, and while we can never pay what DuPont or General Electric does, because we don't
have tools like stock options, we can use incentive pay and other cash payments.

!d.
313. !d.
314. /d.
315. /d.
316. !d.
317. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 278-93 (describing how ETS's non-profit status, clever public
relations, and adept legal maneuvers provide it a shield against review by agencies like the FTC, and
insure that "ETS remains almost immune to public oversight," /d. at 284).
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ETS's entry into the test-prep market, "[T]hey're the same sniveling,
318
money-grubbing for-profit businessmen that the rest of us are. "
Clearly, a characterization of testing agencies as altruistic non-profits
serving the public good, if not misguided, does not tell the whole story.
Were courts to perceive testing agencies as big business instead of as
entities only serving the public good, they might be forced to reconsider
many of the policy arguments behind their deference to testing agencies.

B. Motives Behind Invalidations
Courts have assumed that when testing agencies invalidate scores,
they do so in order to protect the validity of representations made to
universities, employers or institutions relying upon the agency's ability
319
Courts, however,
to "accurately predict the aptitude of a candidate."
have failed to consider or address the fact that ETS also has a very strong
interest in invalidating scores that might undermine the public's belief in
the reliability of the standardized testing process itself.
For many years ETS maintained that, as accurate indicators of
knowledge and skills built up over years of study, standardized tests were
very stable measures. Important to ETS's contention that standardized
tests accurately indicated knowledge and skills rather than test-takin~
2
ability was the notion that tests were impervious to test-prep coaching?
Indeed, ETS made claims that even after many hours of test-prep classes,
a student could improve his standardized score by only a couple of points
321
at most, and therefore test-prep courses were largely a waste of time.
Nonetheless, in living proof against these claims, companies like
Kaplan and Princeton Review continued to grow and prosper, and
privileged teenagers, ostensibly well-informed by their wealthy parents
322
and peers, continued to take good advantage of test-prep coaching.
At
the same time that influential opinions like In re K.D. v. Educational
323
Testing Service
were being written by judges in the 1970's, ETS still
maintained that standardized test scores on their tests could not be
324
increased by coaching.
Since that time, however, ETS's position has
changed. In the face of numerous studies that coaching can improve
scores significantly, even an average of 100 points on SAT's, ETS
softened its stand. Indeed, ETS not long ago went into business against
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Critics Blast, supra n. 28, at A35.
In reKD., 386 N.Y.S.2dat 752.
See Stockwell, supra n. 80, at 6-10.
!d.
!d. at 3-5.
386 N.Y.S.2d 747.
!d. at 7.
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its test-pre~ adversaries and began to market its own test-prep
32
materials. - Yet even though ETS now admits that an examinee can
improve SAT scores by perhaps 30 to 40 points through coaching, they
continue to maintain, against the best evidence, that score increases of
326
100 points as a result of coaching are exceedingly rare.
Courts should recognize that score increases large enough to raise
testing agency red flags are not only disturbing to testing agencies
because they might indicate cheating by students, but also because, if
legitimate, they strike at the testing agencies' claims to reliability,
27
stability, and the effective predictability of their tests? Additionally,
they call into question the fairness of a system that allows those who can
328
afford coaching to gain a significant advantage over those who cannot.
Perhaps it makes sense for courts to grant testing agencies the
discretion necessary to protect themselves and their clients against
cheaters. No test-taker should be allowed to gain unfair advantage by
cheating at the expense of another test-taker, nor should universities or
other institutions be misled into thinking that someone's testing abilities
were better than they actually were.
On the other hand, courts should not be in the business of protecting
testing methodologies or empowering ETS to unfairly invalidate unusual
scores simply because they upset ETS's long-held contention that scores
across successive tests cannot be significantly improved. This is a
business interest, or at best an ideological interest, but certainly not an
equitable interest. To the extent that courts are protecting such interests
they are simply favoring one party's well-being over the other party's.
Moreover, to assist testing agencies in covering up data that casts doubt
on the reliability of testing methodologies makes a mockery of the very
policy interest courts seek to protect-"the reliance that students,
educational institutions, prospective employers and others place on the
329
legitimacy of scores released by [the testing agency]. "
C. Reliability ofAgency Evidence Indicating Cheating

Although courts have generally assumed the reliability of agency
evidence indicating cheating, there are many reasons to suspect the
validity of the most popular forms of evidence offered by testing
agencies. Evidence concerning the statistical rarity of large score

325. !d. at 10-11.
326. !d.

327. !d. at 1-2.
328. !d. 1-2. 20- 21.
329.

Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 294.
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increases and evidence concemmg handwriting compansons are
particularly suspect.
Courts reviewing testing invalidation cases have largely accepted the
testing agency position that large score increases across successive
standardized tests are in and of themselves suggestive of wrongful
330
activity.
However, in light of the inherent conflict of interest testing
agencies manifest in investigating large score increases, discussed in the
previous subsection, courts should be more skeptical of this proposition.
Moreover, as a matter of logic, one does not prove the unnaturalness of
an event by its rarity alone. For example, it may be extremely rare that a
falling brick strikes a pedestrian, but that does not lead to a conclusion
that a malicious human being dropped the brick from a rooftop. In the
same way, it is quite possible that an extremely large and
correspondingly rare score increase achieved by an examinee across tests
may be a result of a combination of unusual but innocent factors. Some
factors that could account for an increase include prep-school studying
following the first exam, the examinee's lack of motivation on the first
132
331 h
· ·
·
be1ore
..
exam,
t e tak.mg o f me d.Icatwn
the fi1rst exam,· an lilJUIY.
333
33
.
.
d
b
..
h
fi
h
fi
sustame
e1ore t e Irst exam,
test anxiety on t e 1rst exam, 'l
335
.
.
.
Improper
testing
con d.1t10ns
on t he fi1rst exam,
personaI pro bl ems
330. See e.g. Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (noting that in its internal rt'view, ETS "took into
consideration the tact that only three test takers out of a sample of over 7,000 recorded gains of more
than 42 points in [a] General Knowledge test").
331. Koza, 2001 WL II'! I 050 at *2 n. 6 (quoting an examinee's statement, "My first score was
a mindless effort. This resulted from someone who didn't care about his score and didn't think it
mattered.").
332. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 52'! (noting plaintiffs claim that she was taking prescription
narcotics prior to her first exam to lessen the pain from a hand injury).
333. !d.
334. Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (describing the case of an examinee who suffered from this
condition).
335. See Law School Discussion, Anyhodv Have Testing Irregularities> I Did and I'm
Complaining,
http://70.84.78.174/prclaw/index.php?PHPSESSID~2d633edfc52b7a I de64c41 e955ta68
8b&topic= 16273.msg246216 (accessed Mar. 1, 2006) (posting recent LSAT test-takers reports of
irregularities and improper testing conditions at 2004 LSA T examinations, such as one student's
account as follows: "At my site the lead administrator came to the door and spoke to the proctor,
then the proctor interrupted us in Section 2 without stopping the clock to tell us she needed for us to
tear the bottoms of our tickets off and give her the top. Several people started to do this, others
looked around in distress until someone tlnally said can we do this after the section'? At least 1--2
minutes gone. I was working on RC, got distracted and had to start the passage over and didn't tin ish
2 questions. She also interrupted us at least once per section to tell us to have our IDs out for checks
and to clear the aisles so she could walk around 'without tripping'"); see also infra nn. 350, 351
(discussing website postings of students detailing numerous instances of testing irregularities and
unfair testing conditions during standardized exams); supra n. 141 (discussing the improper test
conditions described in Mindel. 559 N.Y.S.2d 95); infi·a n. 351 (discussing the author's experience at
an LSA T exam).
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interfering with the examinee's concentration on the first exam, or
336
allowance for the use of a calculator on the second exam.
The focus of the cheating inquiry, therefore, should be over the
quality of the evidence the agency presents in conjunction with a large
score increase. Where this evidence consists of statistical evaluations
regarding comparisons between the suspected examinee's sheet and
another test-taker's, cases range from those in which the numerical odds
337
against the integrity of the score are truly daunting
to those in which
courts have recognized that agency data may be questionable or even
.
d'Ite d .338
d ISCre
Testing agency accusations of cheating by impersonation are
generally far less convincing than accusations of copying, given the fact
that they are based almost exclusively on supposed handwriting
discrepancies between successive tests. Besides any doubts about the
339
credibility of opinions given by agency handwriting experts,
there are
several reasons to view such accusations with skepticism. First,
handwriting analysis, conducted as it too often has been by "experts"
340
. Is, can be a notonous
· Iy ·mcxact science:
·
wit. h dub.wus ere dentta
Second, handwriting samples produced months apart could vary due to
I.1mmatunty,
. prescn.b e d drug use;341 or nervousness.
.
changes .m emotwna
Third, far more reliable evidence, ignored by testing agencies, may be
virtually conclusive of whether an examinee took his own test, for
example, fingerprints on the testing materials themselves, or the credible
.
.
. .
d t he test. 342
eyewitness
testimony
o f t he proctors w ho ad m1mstere
336. Koza, 200 I WL 1191050 at *I (The plaintiff claimed he "was able to make short cuts
with [his] Tl-82 calculator [that] cut the amount oftimc [he] spent on problems in half.").
337. See supra n. 81 (discussing convincing statistical evidence suggesting cheating by an
examinee).
338. See Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530 (noting that "plaintiff adduced expert evidence which
attacked [ETS's] statistical analytical methods as unreliable").
339. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (recounting how one examinee accused by ETS of cheating
by impersonation showed at trial that ETS's handwriting expert "was the same individual who had
attested to the authenticity of the forged Howard Hughes signature on the celebrated Clifford Irving
check").
340. Moenssens, supra n. 73, at n. 21 ("The appalling fact that graphologists without training
in scientific questioned document examination succeed in hoodwinking the legal profession is
further exemplified by the fact that the respected publisher of the multi-volume PROOF OF FACTS
recently commissioned the writing of the new chapter on questioned document examination-handwriting identification, to a graphoanalyst, Dorothy Lehman, who lacks standing in the field of
forensic document examiners."); see U.S v. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, **2-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3,
1999) (providing a discussion on the admissibility of handwriting analysis after Daubert).
341. Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (recounting how a tcstee who suffered from test anxiety and
took tranquilizers to improve her score believed that the tranquilizers she took affected the quality of
her handwriting and led to ETS 's suspicions).
342. See Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46 (noting that consideration of these and other proofs
were ignored by ETS in its internal investigation).
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The heavy weight afforded these suspect forms of evidence is quite
disturbing, especially in the context of a determination limited to the
issue of whether a testing agency had a substantial basis to challenge a
score or conducted its investigation in good faith. Were courts to afford
examinees' proofs their proper weight within determinations on the
merits of whether instances of cheating actually occurred, a more
searching inquiry into the testing agencies' methods of investigation
would likely result.

D. Weightiness ofTest-takers' Interests and False Assumptions
Concerning Re-testing
Contrary to general assumptions by courts that a test-taker's interest
in relief is minimal, especially in light of the possibility of re-testing, the
interests of suspected test-takers in the honesty of their scores are
weighty. Aside from "the serious educational and vocational
ramifications that may flow from a finding that [an examinee]
343
cheated,"
an examinee also has an interest in his or her good name and
self-esteem. These intangible interests stand apart from the worldly
consequences flowing from score invalidation, but are no less worthy of
consideration by a court ruling in equity. Thus far, however, few courts
have even addressed what a suspected examinee stands to lose by an
accusation of cheating (or in the case of group invalidation, by a mere
association with an accusation of cheating).
First and foremost, courts undervalue a test-taker's interest in his or
her good name. It may be said that an accusation of cheating is akin to a
criminal charge, and in some cases it actually may be far worse, since
certain passionate crimes may be morally justified, whereas cheating for
self-advantage almost never is.
Though courts have repeatedly noted or assumed that the
requirement that examinees retest in order to validate questioned scores
(and their good name) is "eminently reasonable," and suggested that it is
the suspected examinee who by refusing to retest is acting unreasonably,
this presumption of a test-taker's guilt endorses a kind of "cheater's
proof' logic and authoritarianism that might be objectionable to many
Americans. In light of a presumption that the test-taker is innocent rather
than guilty, a viewpoint yet to be explicitly entertained by any court, the
requirement of re-testing takes on an altogether different cast. Certainly,
to a test-taker wrongly accused, agreeing to re-test may feel like a
validation of the testing agency's wrongful accusations. Though the testtaker who stands on principal and refuses to re-test might be displaying
343. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530.

150

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2006

an overabundance of pride or even stubbornness, her reaction is
nonetheless understandable.
Moreover, even if an innocent test-taker has no principled objection
to re-testing, she or he may have legitimate practical concerns about
submitting to a reexamination. For example, the test-taker may not have
the same confidence in the reliability and consistency of the testing
process as the agency has in itself. After all, the innocent test-taker who
has been wrongly accused by an authority that evinces absolute certainty
in its investigatory methods and proofs may justifiably doubt that
company's promises of a fair and consistent retest as well.
Indeed, recent events suggest that there may be cause to mistrust the
accuracy of cunent scoring processes in general. As this article goes to
press, the College Board has had to acknowledge that widespread and
extremely large computer-scanning enors were made in scoring the
October 2005 SAT exam, which were only discovered after two students
requested that their tests be re-scored by hand. 344 To date, the Board,
which has several times had to go back on earlier reports that understated
the problem, admits 4,400 scores from that exam were marked too low,
with the largest error coming in at 450 points. 345 The Board reported that
1,600 exams from the October test that had been "separated for special
processing because of security and other questions" had not yet been
rescored but would be. 346
This disturbing SAT debacle comes on the heels of an $11.1 million
settlement announced in March, 2006 between ETS and thousands of
teachers who were inconectly graded on their Praxis teacher-licensing
exams, many of whom claimed serious damage to their teaching careers
as a result. 347 Altogether, roughly 27,000 teachers were inconectly
graded between January 2003 and April 2004, including 4, l 00 who
· d enoneous f:a1.,.mg scores.·34X
receive
But regardless of whether the prospective re-tester has doubts about
the integrity of the exam, she may simply doubt her own ability to come
within the required range necessary to prove the questioned score. For
the test-taker who suffers from test anxiety, low self-esteem, or serious
depression (no doubt likely to be worsened by an accusation of cheating),
344. Karen W. Arenson, SAT Prohlems Even Larger Than Reported, NY Times, Mar. 23,
2006,
availahle
at
http://www. nyti mcs.com/2006/03/23/cducation/23sat.html")cx ~ 1300770000&en~ cab569
43dc68c522&ci=5088&partneFrssnyt&emc~rss (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
345. !d.
346. !d.
347. Settlement in Testing Service Lawsuit, CNN.com, Mar. 16, 2006 at http://www.cnn.com/
2006/EDUCA TION/03/16/testing.error.lawsuits.ap/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006 ).
34S. /d.
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this is a legitimate concern. Requiring this sort of examinee to re-test
under great pressure at a comparable level might be like asking a
shortstop who just hit a homerun to duplicate the feat in his next at-bat.
Although, as discussed earlier in this article, the Scott court
suggested that the test-taker's interests and the testing agencies' interests
overlapped in "a common concern that [the testing agency's] scores be
349
this is a specious argument. The truth is that the examinee
reliable,"
who suffers from depression or test anxiety has no such stake in the
objective validity of her test score, let alone the standardized testing
process itself. This test-taker already knows that standardized tests
results are an unreliable measure of her abilities. Her only interest lies in
proving that despite difficulties in testing well, at least once, she did
succeed.
E. Effectiveness of Invalidation in Combating Cheating and Maintaining
Reliability

Because testing agencies generally invalidate only those scores
which have been red-flagged for showing large increases over preceding
scores, there are reasons to doubt the final key assumption of courtsthat invalidating scores is an effective way to protect against cheating
and maintain testing reliability.
To begin with, it stands to reason that if a test-taker can raise his
score drastically by glancing over at another test-taker's paper, then
lower levels of cheating must be easier to achieve and far more
prevalent. Surely, if a cheater can copy enough answers to raise his score
by x number of points, he can cheat with a little less industriousness,
copy fewer answers, and raise his score by a significant but less
suspicious amount. Similarly, imposters who are capable of scoring
drastically higher than the individuals for whom they test can play it
smart by testing to a lower level, thereby managing to fly under the
agency radar.
Moreover, catching violators by red-flagging large increases in
scores does nothing to catch those inveterate cheaters who cheat the first
time around. Again, if an examinee can raise his score by a large number
of points on his second or third test through copying, he may also be able
to do so on his first test and never be detected.
Apparently, testing agencies are not terribly concerned about those
who cheat the first time or who escape detection by cheating to a lesser
degree. Perhaps this is because such cheating does not produce
embarrassingly large score increases across tests-score increases that
349. Scull, 600 A.2d at 504.
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testing agencies might hav ~ trouble explaining to educators and
employers who have reservations about the validity of standardized
testing. How else can one justify agency complacency in failing to
institute safeguards that could make such drastically successful score
" 350
.
b y ch eatmg
. more d'ffi
mcreases
1 Icu Jt to ac h'Ieve:
Further evidence that authentic reliability is not a priority for testing
agencies can be found in the failure of those agencies to institute even
rudimentary safeguards to insure against unfair and inconsistent testing
conditions, a far more prevalent and serious problem than cheating. For
example, the fact that ETS does not bother to provide proctors with
reliable digital timepieces that would at least improve the chances that all
examinees receive the same amount of time in which to take their
351
352
.
tests,
alone speaks volumes.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that

350. For a sense of what goes on during high school PSAT. SAT, and AP exams, see College
," hltp://talk.collegeconfidential.com/
Confidential, ETS Needs to Step up Its Test Security.
showthread.php~t=9852 (accessed Mar. I, 2006), a chat room thread in which an owner of a test
preparation tutoring company attempts to engage students in a conversation regarding irregularities
and cheating on such standardized high school exams, and expresses dismay at ETS' failure to send
in independent proctors or monitors to ensure proper testing conditions at high schools. Conveying
the generally indifferent sentiment a number of students manifested in response to their own reports
of, inter alia, lazy, incompetent proctors, various forms of blatant cheating, and large timing
irregularities, one student remarked: "I've never seen blatanr (sic) cheating at the Si\TS hesidcs little
things like flipping back, flipping ahead, or starting a minute early ... ."!d.
351. See Law School Discussion, supra n. 335 (posting recent LSAT examinees' numerous
reports of timing irregularities occurring at 2004 LSA T exams where proctors made incorrect time
announcements, ended exam sections too early, or allowed students to look ahead at sections or start
sections early). See also supra n. 350 (discussing a chat room thread that details students' numerous
anecdotal reports of blatant cheating and testing irregularities, including timing irregularities during
PSAT, SAT, and AP exams); Silent Technology, The Silent Timerrct. Testimonial & Stories,
http://silenttimer.com/stories/ (accessed Mar. I, 2006) (promoting a device that allows one to time
one's exam silently and flashes a light when a test section's time is running out; and providing
testimonials from examinees who were able to improve their scores significantly through use of the
device, which has the advantage over regular timers of not beeping and disturbing other test-takers).
While Silent Technologies warns purchasers of its test-oriented timer: "Some tests do not allow
timers at all, and others do. The best thing to do is contact your testing administration to be sure,"
Silent Technologies, Legali(v FAQ, http://silenttimer.com/timcr/filq2.php'!cat~7 "Can I usc THE
SILENT TIMER on test day?" (accessed Mar. I, 2006), its own consumer testimonials make clear
that examinees arc using such devices regardless of any rules against them. Silent Technology, The
Silent Timern 1: Testimonial & Stories, supra 351. Although rules against timers, if in place to
prevent examinees from disturbing others with beeping sounds and causing false stoppages, have a
legitimate purpose, it seems clear that if they stop most examinees from using timing devices, while
others enjoy the advantages of such devices, inequities obviously will result.
The author's own experience provides first-hand confirmation of the kind of timing
irregularities that apparently occur at LSA T exams. In December of 2000, I took the LSA T exam
administered at the University of Pennsylvania. I used a digital watch that accurately reflected the
time remaining in any given section of the exam. Upon discovering that the proctor ended the first
two sections of the exam close to a minute early, I spoke with her. She assured me she was carefully
monitoring the time and that her watch, which she showed me, was accurate. To my amazement, it
was a dial watch, with no second hand! Fortunately for me, I took the advice of test-prep books I had
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egregious testing conditions may not be so rare, and that less egregious
53
but nonetheless significant lapses are common?
Testing agency complacency regarding unfair test-site conditions
should cause courts to question whether empowering testing agencies
with greater discretion to invalidate large score increases serves the
purpose of increasing overall testing validity. In fact, the opposite may
be true. If testing agencies are given unbridled freedom to invalidate
large score increases they label suspicious, they can protect their image
of reliability while evading closer scrutiny of their testing procedures.
By contrast, if testing agencies in appropriate cases were required to
prove cheating by a suspected examinee, the deficiencies of their testing
apparatus would be exposed for all to see. For example, in those cases
where an accused examinee argues that he could not possibly have
cheated because he was seated too far away to see the dots on another
354
test-taker's sheet,
or that he thought each person's test sheet was
numbered differently, it would not only be ironic to hear the testing
agency argue to the contrary, but also helpful to hear the agency's
explanations for not providing the test-taker a more secure environment
in which to test. Such an airing of crucial facts might prompt a discussion
of why testing agencies which earn tens of mill ions of dollars in "profits"
over expenses, choose not to spend greater resources on hiring more
proctors, providing better training for proctors, seating examinees further
apart, instituting more sophisticated identity checks, or developing other
means to greatly lessen or even eliminate the potential for copying or
impersonation.

read by Kaplan and Princeton Review advising that proctors commonly shorted examinees on time
and that one should therefore try to finish a minute early. Others present at that exam, however, may
have failed to till in any number of answers in time.
352. To allow proctors to time by their own timepieces, which may not even have second
hands, see supra note 351, when LSA T examinees, for example, have paid more than 100 dollars
each for the privilege of testing is nothing short of astounding. One can only conclude that every
year a good number of law students arc accepted or rejected by their chosen law school based simply
upon whether a proctor happened to give their testing group a minute more or a minute less on an
LSA T test section. The fact that ETS docs not take simple measures to eliminate this problem, which
must surely have been called to its attention numerous times, cannot be explained by cost concerns.
Reliable digital watches could he purchased in bulk at a cost of only a couple of dollars each.
Moreover, they could even be specially manufactured to provide just one countdown function for
those exams, like the LSAT, where each section is of equal length, virtually eliminating the chance
for timing errors. All the proctor would have to do is push the button. The stopwatch could of course
be re-used on the next exam.
353. Supra nn. 335, 351, 352.
354. Sec Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *2 n. 6 (noting that examinee claimed he could not
possibly have copied so many problems while "sitting in a five feet radius" from other test-takers).
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE APPROACH TO TESTING
lNVALIDA TION CASES

Given the fact that so many of the assumptions underlying judicial
deference to testing agencies are grounded on fallacies, courts should
rethink their approach to testing invalidation cases. A new starting point
for courts should be to recognize that standardized testing is just one
means to predict the abilities of students and employees-indeed a
means that has been deemed untenable and unreliable by many respected
educational authorities. The standardized testing industry should no
longer be accorded the mantle of a quasi-educational apparatus engaged
in unquestionably meritorious activities. A fairer assessment would be
that testing agencies are self-interested corporate giants providing
products and services, at a cost underwritten by testee consumers, to
those institutions that subscribe to their methods of determining aptitude.
Courts should also recognize that as candidates for certain
institutions, examinees must submit to the monopoly control exercised
by testing companies over the principal means of entry to those
institutions. Consequently, consumers have no choice but to enter into
adhesion contracts written by the testing agencies themselves-contracts
that are lacking in the most basic aspects of consideration that would be
355
. arm , s Iengt h negotiatiOns.
. .
accord e d m
Though ruling on equitable matters, courts have taken an overly
formalistic approach to invalidation cases. Courts have granted testing
corporations the status of public institutions for equitable purposes, yet
have emphasized their private nature for the purposes of due process
inquiries. They have ruled that even when a testing corporation has
utterly refused to consider exonerating evidence in good faith, the
examinee must find a remedy under the terms of an adhesion contract
written by that very same testing corporation.
When a court finds that a testing agency investigation of a flagged
score was not conducted in good faith, it should not hesitate to exercise
its equitable powers in ordering that the questioned score be validated
and released. The approach taken by the court in Martin v. Educational
356
where the court put quotes around the word
Testing Service,
"contract" when referring to the adhesion agreement entered into by a
standardized test-taker, and doubted the enforceability of some of its
355. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 264 (noting the dearth of conditions in the testing contract "that
the consumer can legally compel ETS to honor," for example, "scoring the tests accurately, getting
the information out on time, or protecting confidentiality").
356. 431 A.2d 868.

CHEATER'S PROOF

97]

155

357

provisions,
is entirely appropriate when the testing agency has
breached its duty of good faith. Contract scholars, proposing a good faith
standard in which willful refusal to consider exculpatory evidence by a
party exercising discretion under the contract "indicates that he does not
358
want to know the truth and amounts to dishonesty,"
have concluded:
Defendant should not escape [the good faith/willful refusal] standard by
asserting that plaintiffs evidence would not have induced him to make
a contrary determination. Defendant's post hoc assertion is of doubtful
veracity and unverifiable. Therefore, the determination of whether the
relevant criteria are satisfied or the relevant factual conditions exist
should be made not by the defendant but by the court. In the SAT case,
the determination of whether plaintifT cheated would be made by the
court based on all the evidence ipcluding that which plaintifT was
15
denied the opportunity to present.-

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Justice goes wanting when a court reviews the established facts of a
given testing invalidation case, acknowledges that those facts amply
support the innocence of an accused examinee, but nonetheless stops
360
short of granting the examinee a meaningful remedy.
Ruling as they
are in equity, courts should rethink their policy of judicial deference to
testing agencies, choose substance over form, and in appropriate cases
nullify those tem1s of testing adhesion contracts which produce
inequitable results. Only then will courts give meaning to the principle
that, "Where a contract is breached ... and the injured party is entitled to
specific ~erformance, the remedy must be a real one, not an exercise in
61
futility."

357. !d. at 874.
358.

Diamond & Foss, supra n. 180, at 616 (citation omitted).

359. !d. at 617 (emphasis added). The authors made this statement after reviewing the facts of
Dalton.
360. Unfortunately. this is exactly what the New York Court of Appeals did in Dalton. In that
watershed case, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding that ETS demonstrated
an egregious and utter disregard for the relevant and exculpatory proofs provided by the suspected
examinee. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291. Yet the court, ruling in equity. nullified the relief granted by
the trial court and consigned the plaintiff to an empty remedy dictated by the defendant under the
terms of an adhesion contract. Sec id. at 294·95 (seemingly whistling in the wind, the court stated,
"We cannot agree with Dalton's assumption that ETS will merely rubber-stamp its prior
determination without good-faith attention to his documentation and that reconsideration by ETS
will be an empty exercise"). Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., plaintiffs counsel in Dalton, confirmed that
plaintitrs SAT score was never validated by ETS. Telephone Interview with Vincent F. Nicolosi.
Counsel for Plaintiff in Dalton (Mar. 26, 2004 ).
361.

Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 294.

